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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE famous metaphor of Justice Holmes concerning the "fruit and the tree"'
has permeated the tax law to an extent that probably not even its author
could have predicted. Attractive enough as a seedling, thirty-five years later it
shows the result of insufficient pruning. The capital gains landscape is dominated
by "fruit and tree," and its progeny, and it has encroached into places in the
garden where it is neither desirable nor necessary. The purpose of this article
is to offer the current status of the effect of this metaphor upon the meaning of
"property" in the capital asset definition.
"Capital gain" is defined as "gain from the sale or exchange of a capital
asset," 2 and a "capital asset" is all "property ' 3 not within five specific exclu-
sions.4 The meaning of the word "property" has probably been the subject of
more recent litigation than any other single word in the Internal Revenue Code.
A literal application of the definitional section would give capital gain treatment
to receipts from a sale or exchange of anything of value not within the exclu-
sions. The relative narrowness of the exclusions and the resulting broadness of
the capital asset definition results in a vast area of property interests which is
constantly being probed and tested by taxpayers in the hope of receiving the
preferred tax treatment. The courts are besieged by suits for capital gains treat-
ment where the property involved does not nicely fit into the exclusionary cate-
* Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo.
1. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
2. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222(3).
3. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221.
4. (1) Stock in trade, inventory and property held for sale to customers, (2) deprecia-
ble and real property used in the trade or business, (3) copyrights, literary, musical or
artistic property in the hands of the creator and certain others, (4) certain receivables,
(5) certain governmental obligations. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1221(1), (2), (3), (4), (5).
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gories set forth by Congress. Such assets as accrued salary, accrued interest and
prepaid rent, laying claim to "property" status, have contended for capital gain
treatment. Other cases have involved sales or cancellations of personal service
contracts, insurance contracts, sales agency contracts, distributorships, favorable
purchase contracts and negative covenants. Also involved have been interests in
property which are part of a larger estate, such as "carved out" oil payments,
life estates and leases.
Attempting to limit the range of preferred treatment, the courts essentially
have ignored the statutory definition of capital assets, and havt substituted a
series of judicial concepts. In recent years there have evolved quite a number of
these concepts, mainly derived from decisions of the United States Supreme
Court. Often, the standards which have been developed do little more than state
conclusions as to whether the receipt is capital gain or ordinary income, or pro-
ceed from premises which seem to bear little or no relation to capital gains poli-
cies.'
The standards are confusing, sometimes inconsistent, and even irrelevant.
Thus, where a lessor of real property receives from his lessee a lump sum pay-
ment in cancellation of a lease, he is said to receive "a substitute for future
rentals" 6 which is ordinary income. This is not the case if the lease is favorable
to the lessee. Any payment to him in cancellation of the lease is capital gain.
This is so even though he is sub-leasing the premises and, being in the position
of landlord as well as tenant, also receives the value of "future rentals,"7 Also,
the lessee is held to have engaged in a "sale or exchange" 8 while the lessor has
not.9 Or, if a lessor "sells" a term for years for a lump sum payment, he has
ordinary income.' 0 But if the term for years is cast in the form of a life estate,
a sale will bring capital gain" even though the seller continues to hold the re-
mainder.12 In another setting, if an employee receives a lump sum payment in
cancellation of a long term employment contract, he has ordinary income be-
cause he has nothing he can sell,13 or because he has received only a "substitute
for future ordinary income."'14 But, if the right to perform future services for
compensation is embodied in an "exclusive agency" contract, then capital gain is
possible because what has been sold is a "business," even though the substance
5. See generally, Note, Capital Gains: Can the Confusion Be Eliminated?, 49 Iowa L.
Rev. 89 (1963); Note, The Troubled Distinction Between Capital Gain and Ordinary Income,
73 Yale L.J. 693 (1964).
6. Hort v. Commissioner, 313 U.S. 28 (1940).
7. Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
8. Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829
(1954).
9. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 20 T.C.M. 353 (1961).
10. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
11. Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
12. Estate of Johnson N. Camden, 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 139 F.2d
697 (6th Cir. 1943).
13. Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936).
14. Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
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of what has been transferred is the right to perform personal services.15 Again in
the area of contracts, a right to sell for commission the entire output of a coal
mine is not a capital asset because it is a "naked contract right."'1 On the other
hand, it is clear that gain on the sale of an appreciated bond or debenture is
capital gain, and it is difficult to think of a contract more "naked."' 17
These examples are not intended so much to be critical of the courts as to
demonstrate some of the results of their struggle to define the word "property."
Their task is not an enviable one. The statute is not adequate to deal with the
problem. Nor has the tax law had the benefit of a "capital gain" concept from
other disciplines. The economist tends to define "gain" as accretions to wealth,
but has no concern with the notion of "capital gain" as distinguished from "in-
come."' 8 Nor does the accountant have a notion of "capital gain" which is
helpful under the tax law. He is concerned with notions of recurring and non-
recurring receipts and has a concept of capital gain which is narrower than one
necessary to solve tax problems.' The rules governing capital gains taxation
are, therefore, essentially judicially developed in the traditional common law
way. It is the thesis of this paper that the development has been mistakenly
influenced by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in an area which
has only a superficial bearing on the capital asset definition-the "assignment
of income cases."120 In these cases, the Court was dealing not with the nature of
gain but with the choice of taxable person. It was clear that the receipt was to be
taxed as ordinary income and the only question was whether the assignor or the
assignee should pay the tax. However, the Court placed primary reliance on
these cases in struggling with the meaning of "property" in the capital asset
definition. The inquiry becomes whether these cases are sufficiently related to
the capital asset problem to be allowed such influence. This paper will briefly
review the most pertinent of these decisions and discuss their influence in the
formulation of the capital asset definition by the courts. To place the problem
into perspective, however, brief inquiry is necessary into the intent of Congress
in giving preferred tax treatment to "capital assets."
II. THE INTENT OF CONGRESS
In 1921 Congress first defined the term as only that property "acquired"
for "profit or investment." Specifically excluded from the definition were in-
15. Elliot B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941); Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir.
1950); Nelson Weaver Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
16. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
17. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 129 (2d Cir. 1962).
18. Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation, 1959 Tax Revision Com-
pendium 1203, 1204.
19. Ibid. See also, Comment, The P. G. Lake Guides to Ordinary Income: An Appraisat
in Light of Capital Gains Policies, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 551, 552 (1962).
20. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930); Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937)
Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S. 112 (1940); Helvering v. Eubank, 311 U.S. 122 (1940); Harri-
son v. Schaffner, 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
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ventory, stock in trade, and property held for personal use or consumption.21
In 1924 there were deleted the affirmative requirements that the property be
acquired and held for profit or investment.22 The reason for the deletion was
to insure that property held for personal use or consumption would be treated
as a capital asset.2 3 The effect of the 1924 changes was to make all property a
capital asset unless specifically excepted from that category, and this is the
present statutory approach.
The Congressional history as to the policy behind the capital gains provi-
sions parallels the statute in its skimpiness. The report of the House Ways and
Means Committee which recommended enactment of the initial capital gain
provisions in 1921 stated:
The sale of farms, mineral properties, and other capital assets is now
seriously retarded by the fact that gains and profits earned over a series
of years are under the present law taxed as a lump sum (and the
amount of surtax greatly enhanced thereby) in the year in which the
profit is realized. Many such sales, with their possible profit taking
and consequent increase of the tax revenue, have been blocked by this
feature of the present law.2 4
The original purpose of Congress seems to have been: (1) to relieve tax-
payers of the impact of progressive tax rates on "bunched income"; that is, gain
accrued or which will accrue over several years and realized in a single year,
(2) to encourage conversions of capital investments into cash so that the tax
on the gain could be collected; that is, to reduce the "lock-in" effect of taxes,
and (3) to promote economic growth by encouraging taxpayers to risk their
funds in capital investment.25 This last purpose seems clear from the original
definition of a capital asset as "investment" property.2 6
Although Congress may have had some temporary purpose to provide
relief from progressive tax rates on "bunched income" through the capital gains
provision, such policy is of minimal importance today. That the bunching prob-
lem is not a central purpose of the capital gains provision is evidenced by In-
ternal Revenue Code section 1222(3) which fixes the holding period for long
term capital gain at a less than annual period (of more than six months). Thus
capital gain treatment is available although there is no "bunching" of more than
one year's income. Further evidence is the relief from bunching provided by
the averaging provisions, which have been present in the Code for many years,
21. Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136 § 206(a) (6), 42 Stat. 233. See Silverstein, The Capital
Asset Definition, 1959 Tax Revision Compendium 1285; Comment, supra note 19, at 552.
22. Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234 § 208(a) (8), 43 Stat. 263.
23. 65 Cong. Rec. p. 2842 (1924), Comment, supra note 19, at 552.
24. H.R. Rep. No. 350, Part 1, 67th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1921).
25. Comment, Distinguishing Ordinary Income from Capital Gains Where Rights to
Future Income Are Sold, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 741 (1956); Miller, The "Capital Asset"
Concept: A Critique of Capital Gains Taxation: I, II, 59 Yale L.J., 837, 1057, 1068 (1950);
Comment, supra note 19, at 559; H.R. Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. (1942), reprinted
in 1942-2 Cum. Bull. 372, 396.
26. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
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currently embodied in sections 1301-1305. Also, Congress has expressed its intent
not to prefer income simply because it is bunched in excluding from capital
assets "a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, or similar
property" held by the creator.2 7
The other implications of the above statement of the Ways and Means Com-
mittee, that is, that capital gain policies are concerned with inducing capital
investment and capital mobility, seem to be the fundamental congressional policy
in enacting the capital gains provisions. The committee report for the revenue
bill of 1963, as passed by the House, increasing the preferential treatment for
certain capital gains emphasized there was the need for "unlocking" capital in-
vestments in order to mobilize new sources of risk capital, and to provide the
government with additional tax revenues. 28
The Congressional policy then is to allow capital gains only for gains arising
from the disposition of property, and, as is clear from legislative statements, the
exclusions of Sec. 1221, and the more than six months holding period require-
ment of Sec. 1222 (3), only if the property is "investment" property. No prefer-
ential treatment is provided for sales of "business property,"2 9 or for recurring
receipts such as salary, rents or interest, 30 whether received in the normal course
or in a lump sum.31 This policy accords with the commonly accepted notion that
there is no need to offer tax inducement to the normal use of property to produce
income, or for one to offer his personal services for compensation. 32 There is no
real practical choice to withhold from the market one's personal services. How-
ever, there is a choice between selling an investment and holding it for its in-
come, with the possibility of avoiding tax on any appreciation altogether if the
property is held until death.33
The landmark decisions of the United States Supreme Court in this area
agree in general principle with the intent of Congress shown by the legislative
history. These decisions will later be discussed in detail and are now presented
in broad outline as part of the background to later discussion.
In Burnet v. Harmel,34 there was taxed as ordinary income a large bonus
paid to the grantor of an oil lease upon the signing of the lease. The Court analo-
gized the payment to a prepayment of rent, and held that it was not to be within
the intent of Congress "... to relieve the taxpayer from .. .excessive tax
27. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(3). The committee reports accompanying the
proposal for this provision indicate an intent to close a "loophole" allowing capital gain
treatment for bunched income from personal effort. S. Rep. No. 2375, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
43 (1950). See also, Comment, Distinguishing Ordinary Income from Capital Gains Where
Rights to Future Income Are Sold, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 740 (1956).
28. H.R. Rep. No. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 96 (1963).
29. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1221(2), (3), (4). But see § 1231, which allows capital-
gains-ordinary-loss treatment for property which is a business investment, and §§ 1245 and
1250 modifying this treatment.
30. Silverstein, supra note 21, at 1288, discussing S. Rep. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d
Sess., p. 20 (1938).
31. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1221(3), (4).
32. Comment, supra note 27, at 742; But see Miller, supra note 25, at 1076.
33. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014.
34. 287 U.S. 103 (1932).
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burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital investments, and to
remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conversions."38 Somewhat
similar reasoning was employed in Hort v. Commissioner" where an amount
received by a lessor upon cancellation of a long-term lease was held to be ordinary
income in the nature of "future rentals." In Commissioner v. Gillette Motor
Transport, Inc. 37 the Court denied capital gain treatment to lump sum compen-
sation received for the use of transportation facilities during World War II.
Holding the taxpayer had received a payment in the nature of rent, the Court
noted that not all "property" qualifies as a "capital asset." That term, stated
the Court, "is to be construed narrowly in accordance with the purpose of Con-
gress to afford capital-gains treatment only in situations typically involving the
realization of appreciation in value accrued over a substantial period of time,
and thus to ameliorate the hardship of taxation of the entire gain in one year."88
The principle was phrased in the Burnet v Harmel manner in Commissioner v.
P. G. Lake, Inc.8 9 where the sale of a "carved-out" oil payment was held to result
in ordinary income.
The principle, as stated by the Court, recognizes the intent of Congress to
relieve taxpayers from the "bunching" hardship. Yet, although bunching was
involved in all of the above cases, relief was denied because the receipt involved
does not "ordinarily '40 produce such hardship, or the right surrendered is not
the "type" 41 which gives rise to the hardship intended. Bunching, therefore, is
not relevant to capital gains purposes unless it is coupled with the "conversion
of capital investment, '42 or, the same idea differently expressed, arises "in situa-
tions typically involving the realization of appreciation in value ....",3
The emphasis in the above decisions is on the Congressional policy to favor
only gains arising from "realized appreciation in value" as distinguished from
periodic anticipation of recurring receipts. The intent of Congress not to prefer
certain "business" property although there is realized value appreciation is re-
flected in the Court's decision in Corn Products Refining Co. v. Commissioner.44
There the Court denied capital gain treatment to gain arising from dealing in
corn futures where the futures were purchased by the taxpayer to protect itself
against rises in the price of raw corn. Although the Court could have reached
this result simply by analogizing corn futures in the hands of a corn products
manufacturer to inventory or stock in trade, the decision was placed on the
35. Id. at 106.
36. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
37. 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
38. Id. at 134.
39. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
40. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932).
41. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 135 (1960).
42. Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103, 106 (1932).
43. Commissioner v. Gillette Motor Transp., Inc., 364 U.S. 130, 134 (1960).
44. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
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broader ground that the purchases of futures constituted "an integral part of
[taxpayer's] manufacturing business."145
Congress intended that profits and losses arising from the everyday op-
eration of a business be considered as ordinary income or loss rather
than capital gain or loss.46
This principle creates the possibility of treating certain property used in
business as an ordinary asset despite the fact that it is neither stock in trade or
held for sale to customers, nor real or depreciable property.
4 7
III. TE ASSIGNMENT OF INCOME CASES
The first and most important of the assignment of income cases decided by
the United States Supreme Court is Lucas v. Ear 48 where it was held that a
husband could not shift his income to his wife by way of a contract giving her
title to one-half the earnings as a joint tenant. The Court, in an opinion by
Justice Holmes, held that one Who earns income cannot escape the tax by "antic-
ipatory arrangements .. .by which the fruits are attributed to a different
tree from that on which they grew."'49
The fruit-tree metaphor seems to carry the court beyond the point it needed
to reach. The graduated rate structure of the income tax was protected by the
holding that salaries are to be taxed to those who earn them. This result is sen-
sible and, most important, is based squarely on reasons of taxation. Justice
Holmes' horticultural dictum, however, introduced into the tax law a property
concept which has no direct relation to tax policy. As Professor Brown has stated
it: "Judges perhaps more at home with common law ideas than with Revenue
Acts have turned to search for a property concept which could constitute a tree
capable of being transplanted. If -they could discover an income producing
'tree,' capable of being transplanted and which had been transplanted or trans-
ferred, then the deflection was successful. If no tree or no transplant, then no
deflection." 50 Thus, a right merely to future income is not property; but the
asset which produces the income is property. An assignment of the former will
not shift the tax; an assignment of the latter will.
This distinction was clearly made seven years after the decision in Lucas v.
45. Id. at 51.
46. Id. at 52.
47. See generally, Chirelstein, Capital Gain and the Sale of a Business Opportunity:
The Income Tax Treatment of Contract Termination Payments, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 36-43
(1964).
48. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
49. Id. at 115.
50. Brown, The Growing "Common Law" of Taxation, 13 U. So. Cal. Tax Inst. 1, 15
(1961). Professor Brown admonishes: "Beware the metaphor! Of all the anodynes for the
pains of thought, it is the most seductive, the most misleading." For more unfriendly remarks
about the metaphor see Rice, Judicial Trends in Gratuitous Assignments to Avoid Federal
Income Taxes, 64 Yale L.J. 991 (1955). Other commentators find the metaphor useful.
Lyon & Eustice, Assignment of Income: Fruit and Tree as Irrigated by the P. G. Lake Case,
17 Tax L. Rev. 295 (1962).
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Earl when, in Blair v. Commissioner,5 ' the Court held there had been a shift-
ing of the tax to the assignee where the life beneficiary of a trust assigned his
beneficial interest. This, held the Court, was not simply the assignment of a
"chose in action." The life beneficiary was the owner of an equitable interest in
the trust corpus and had assigned the "right, title and estate in and to prop-
erty."52 And so the search had begun for "property" as distinguished from a
mere "chose in action" or "income interest" in the property. Non-tax lawyers
might wince at the suggestion that a right to future income is not property. But
in Blair that word was obviously being used in the sense of "property which
produces the income." Although the life beneficiary was the owner of the income
interest, and in that sense had assigned only a right to future income, it was
held he had assigned an income producing asset, and therefore "property" be-
cause the life estate is an equitable interest in property.
Because the taxpayer in Blair had made an assignment of his entire interest,
that is, an assignment of the income for his life, perhaps the Court felt that there
was not involved a tax avoidance device. The assignment for life is a substantial
price to pay in order to avoid taxes and will not readily be resorted to. Such
a rationale is more germane to the import of the taxing statutes than is the "prop-
erty" approach. The fact that a life interest in a trust is an equitable interest in
property seems unrelated to the question of whether the assignor may shift the
tax on the receipts. This approach requires the Court to make a distinction
between an equitable interest in property and a simple chose in action for money,
a distinction which has no apparent basis in capital gains policy. Most important,
the property approach camouflages the fact that what the life tenant owns is
indeed only the right to future income. His bundle of rights consists of no more
than the right to income, and to compel the trustee to pay or account for the
income; and the income producing property-the tree if you will-is the corpus.55
The Court itself recognized this fact, albeit in another context, in Irwin v.
Gavit,54 where it was held that amounts received by a beneficiary of a testa-
mentary trust, although property, were taxable income and not bequests ex-
empted by statute: "... . the provision of the act that exempts bequests assumes
the gift of a corpus and contrasts it with the income arising from it, but was not
intended to exempt income property so-called simply because of a severance
between it and the principal fund." 55 In so distinguishing between the income
producing corpus and the income interest, the Court rejected the position of
the dissent that: "Money, of course, is-property . . . It was a gift by will,-
51. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
52. Id. at 13-14.
53. Note, 50 Yale L.J. 512, 516 (1941); Surrey, Assignments of Income and Related
Devices: Choice of the Taxable Person, 33 Colum. L. Rev. 791, 801 (1933). Note also the
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code which treat the life tenant as in the income
shoes of the remainderman, section 102(b) taxing to the life tenant income acquired bygift, bequest, devise or inheritance; section 273 disallowing amortization of a life estate
acquired by gift, bequest or inheritance.
54. 268 U.S. 161 (1925).
55. Id. at 167.
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a bequest .... The money here sought to be taxed was not the fruits of a
legacy; it was the legacy itself."5 6
But the Blair doctrine was not to be carried too far. In Helvering v. Clif-
ford,57 the income of a trust payable to the taxpayer's wife was held taxable to
the taxpayer-grantor because of the short term of the trust, the grantor's re-
tained powers over the corpus, and the fact that his wife was the beneficiary,
although no support obligation was being discharged. The transfer was in the
nature of a temporary shifting of income with no passing of substantial rights
over the income producing property. Therefore, the transfer was treated as an
assignment only of the income interest and not of the underlying property.
In Clifford, the Court stated that there was no need to rely on the rule of
Lucas v. Earl.5 8 Although the device used by the taxpayer in Clifford is simply
another way of avoiding the progressive tax on income while substantially re-
taining the corpus, the Court, while holding against the taxpayer, apparently
saw the case as different from an assignment of future income problem. However,
in Helvering v. Horst,59 which held that the owner of a coupon bond could not
shift the tax on bond interest by assigning the interest coupon to his son before
the due date, the Court relied on Lucas v. Earl stating that income is to be
taxed ". . . to him who earns, or creates and enjoys it . . . . Nor is it per-
ceived that there is any adequate basis for distinguishing between the gift of
interest coupons here and a gift of salary or commissions . . . . [Tihe fruit
is not to be attributed to a different tree from that on which it grew."'60
On the day the Horst case was decided, the Court also decided Helvering
v. Eubank6' where an assignment of future renewal commissions payable for the
past services of a life insurance agent in writing policies was held not to shift the
tax. Relying on Horst, and extending Lucas v. Earl to a situation where no
further services were required, the assignor was held taxable on the commis-
sions.
In Harrison v. Schaffner, -6 2 the Blair rule was limited when its benefit was
refused to a life beneficiary of a trust who assigned dollar amounts of the trust
income for a year following the assignment. In so doing the Court was required
to reject the argument of the taxpayer that under the Blair doctrine there had
been a conveyance of an equitable interest in property. 3 Refusing to be troubled
by "the logical difficulties of drawing the line between the gift of an equitable
interest in property for life effected by a gift for life of a share of the income of
the trust and the gift of the income or a part of it for the period of a year as in
this case,"164 the Court decided the case simply on the ground that "taxation is
56. Id. at 168-69.
57. 309 U.S. 331 (1940).
58. Id. at 338.
59. 311 U.S. 112 (1940).
60. Id. at 120.
61. 311 U.S. 122 (1940).
62. 312 U.S. 579 (1941).
63. Id. at 583.
64. Id. at 583.
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a practical matter" 65 and since the assignor had given up rights of so little sub-
stance, the Court would not, simply because the transfer was a disposition of
"property," allow "the form to obscure the reality." 6
So it appears that what "in reality" is "property" in Blair becomes "not
really" "property" in Schaffner, the difference being not the qualitative nature of
the interest transferred, but the factor of tax avoidance. The nub of the problem,
of course, is the inherent weakness of the Blair dichotomy between "property"
and "income," which is so firmly rooted in the "fruit-tree" metaphor.
IV. JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE WORD "PROPERTY" IN THE
CAPITAL ASSET DEFINITION
In the foregoing cases, the Supreme Court was faced with the problem of
preventing avoidance of the progressive tax rates. The cases turned upon a dis-
tinction made between transfers of "property" and transfers of "future income."
The Supreme Court, and, following its lead, the lower courts, have thought the
same distinction to be controlling in cases where the issue is not the choice of
a taxable person, but the nature of the income-capital gains or ordinary income.
The Lease Cancellation Cases
The transplant of the "fruit-tree" analysis into the capital gains area oc-
curred in Hort v. Commissioner.67 There the Court taxed as ordinary income a
lump sum payment received by a lessor from his lessee upon cancellation of the
lease. The court assumed that the lease was "property," but, analogizing to the
interest coupon in Horst, it held that the lump sum payment was not a return
of capital but ". . . essentially a substitute for rental payments which . . .
must be regarded as ordinary income ... r,8
But it proves nothing to say that gain is not capital gain merely because it
is essentially a substitute for future ordinary income. Or, it might be said that it
proves too much. Such a view would make every sale of property give rise to
ordinary income. The amount received on a sale of a share of stock is in large
part the value of the future dividends to be paid upon the stock. The gain re-
ceived on a sale of a bond is attributable to the excess of the bond interest rate
over the current market rate, which would have been received by the bond holder
as ordinary income had he not sold the bond.69 Thus the future ordinary income
65. Id. at 582.
66. Id. at 583.
67. 313 U.S. 28 (1941).
68. Id. at 31.
69. United States v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963). The Court
addressed itself to this point at 58:
But we feel that the broad assertion made that, in any case where the purchase
price includes anticipated income there can be no capital gains treatment, must be
answered .... As a legal or economic position, this cannot be so. The only com-
mercial value of any property is the present worth of future earnings or usefulness.
If the expectation of earnings of stock rises, the market value of the stock may
rise; at least a part of this increase in price is attributable to the expectation of
increased income. The value of a vending machine, as metal and plastic, is almost
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rationale is self-defeating in the capital gains area. It may be somewhat useful
in the assignment of income cases, such as Horst, where the purpose of the rule
is to prevent the shifting of income tax among related taxpayers except at the
cost of giving up a substantial quantum of rights in the income producing prop-
erty. This purpose is well served by refusing to give tax effect to temporary re-
allocations of future income where the taxpayer has retained a substantial present
reversion or given up his rights only for a short period.70 Thus, in Horst, the
retention of the bond prevented the shifting of the tax on the assigned interest
coupon. The retained bond was a clear indication that an insufficient quantum
of rights had been transferred to allow shifting of the tax. Hence, the "property"
was retained and only "future income" was transferred. Put in terms of capital
gains policies, the retention of a reversion after a transfer may indicate there
has been no termination of one's interest in an asset; no "conversion" of the
investment. This seems to be the way the Court viewed the lessor's receipt in
Hort-the same as a prepayment of rent at the inception of the lease. 71 Had this
been the case, Horst would be persuasive authority since there would have been
no termination of interest in any asset.72 However, in Hort the lessor did ter-
minate his interest in the lease. Also, he did not receive the payment from the
lessee as rent, but for the appreciation in value of the lessee's commitment
in the lease. The lessee paid no part of the money for rent as he was no
longer to occupy the premises. The payment was made in return for a
release from a promise to pay a specified rent because that obligation was
no longer bringing the tenant a favorable return; the rental value of the premises
had depreciated for the tenant, which brought about a corresponding apprecia-
tion of the value of the lease to the lessor. For example, suppose a lease calls for
a periodic rental of 1000 dollars and the rental value of the premises declines to
900 dollars. The lessor now owns a lease with a premium value; that is, with a
value quite independent of the value of the underlying real estate. A payment by
the lessee in cancellation of the lease will be in an amount reflecting the differ-
ence between the present value of the unmatured rental payments and the fair
nil; its value arises from the fact that it will produce income.
At common law, the right to receive income from land was ownership of the
land. Lord Coke said: "If a man seized of land in fee by his deed granteth to
another the profits of these lands, to have and to hold to him and his heirs, and
maketh livery secundum forman chartae, the whole land itself doth pass. For what
is land but the profits thereof?" Co. Lit. 45 (Emphasis added.)
Zarky, Capital Gain Concepts: What is a "Capital" Asset? When is there a "Sale or
Exchange"?, 11 U. So. Cal. Tax Inst., 357, 372 (1959). "In a sense, every sale of property
is a commuted realization of the future income which can be earned, a conclusion which
seems fairly evident where the asset is self-liquidating or of wasting nature, but is no less
true of depreciable property or even of land itself. Thus, the line to be drawn between
transfers of income and of income-producing property itself, is not always a simple one to
discern."
70. Compare Int. Rev. Code § 673, which allows the tax to be shifted upon a transfer
in trust of more than 10 years, and Rev. Rul. 38, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 389, following Blair
with respect to a transfer by a trust beneficiary of trust income for a period of at least 10
years.
71. 313 U.S. at 30.
72. See cases cited in note 118, infra.
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rental value of the property for the unexpired term of the lease; that is, the
present value of 100 dollars for the unexpired period of the lease. Such payment
represents appreciation in value of the lease. Thus, in Hoyt, upon the cancellation
the landlord received back his original capital, the land free of the lease, together
with his gain, the value of the appreciation in the promise to pay rent due to a
decline in the rental market. The lessor was not engaging in the periodic anticipa-
tion of future rentals. He was completely terminating his interest in a valuable
asset which was separate and distinct from the reversion-the lease.
As one writer has pointed out,73 it is difficult to see, except for the reversion
owned by the lessor, how his position is different from the owner of a bond which
has appreciated due to a general decline in the market rate of interest. Upon a
sale of the bond, he receives back his original investment together with an
amount reflecting the present value of the difference between the stated interest
rate and the current market rate. Both the lessor and the bondholder have in-
vested capital in a promise-the bondholder in a promise to pay a stated interest;
the lessor in a promise to pay a stated rent. 74 Each has converted his investment
and in each case there has been received back the original investment together
with gain due to the appreciation of the promise. Both gains seem to be within
the capital gains policies; yet, the bondholder will receive capital gain and the
lessor will receive ordinary income, apparently because of the presence in the
lessor of a reversion. Thus, suppose that in Hort the landlord had sold the fee in
the real property. The amount received which is attributable to the favorable
lease would clearly be capital gain, although entirely attributable to appreciation
in the value of the promise to pay rent and in no wise attributable to the value
of the real estate independent of the lease. The reason for denial of capital gain
in Hort seems to be the retention of the reversion, a factor which seems clearly
irrelevant where the lease has a value independent of the value of the reversion.7"
73. Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 27-29, 31.
74. By entering the lease, the lessor submitted his capital to an investment risk, i.e.,
that the value of the rental market would rise, in return for the recurring receipts in the
nature of rent together with the counter-balancing chance that the rental market would
decline and his lease would appreciate. See Chireistein, supra note 47, at 27-29. Cf. Comment,
supra note 27, at 742-43 (1956). His situation is analogous to the purchaser of a bond
who submits to a risk that the interest rate will rise in return for recurring interest
payments together with the counter-balancing chance that the interest rate will fall and
the bond appreciate. In both situations any gain received on sale is due to the appreciation
in value of the asset. Chirelstein, supra.
75. Continuing with the effect of a retention of the reversion in Hort, and the com-
parison by the Court with the Horst situation, suppose that in Horst, the bond contained
a stated interest rate of 5%, the market dropped to 4%, and the obligor renegotiated with
the bondholder the interest rate so that in consideration of a lump sum payment the bond
would thereafter carry only a 4% rate. It seems clear that the payment to the bondholder
should be capital gain in spite of the fact that the bondholder has retained the bond and
has sold simply the appreciated element in the promise to pay interest, and even though,
had that appreciated element been received over the life of the bond it would have been
ordinary income. It should not matter that the bondholder continues to hold the underlying
bond and receives a reduced rate of interest. Essentially what he has done is to sell the 5%
bond in return for his original capital together with the present value of 1% for the life of
the bond, and then reinvested his capital in a 4% bond. In a sense, the owner of the real
property in Hort could be said to be in an identical position, i.e., could be treated as having
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The influence of Horst seems to have caused the presence of a reversion in the
lessor to lead to a finding by the Court of no "closed transaction," 76 that only
"income" and not "property" had been transferred.
Following Hort the authorities of course hold that upon the cancellation of
a lease, gain to the lessor is ordinary income in the nature of a substitute for
rent.77 In Spray Water Power and Land Co.,7 8 a lessor released his lessee from
a 999 year lease, requiring payment of 2000 dollars a year for a daily supply of
water. Although the Tax Court ultimately relied upon the "substitute for rental
payments" rationale of Hort, the emphasis of the opinion was on the fact that
cancellation of a lease, at least in so far as the lessor is concerned, is not a "sale
or exchange" because there is nothing "transferred." The lessor sells merely a
release from the obligation to pay rent and consequently, there is no transfer
to the lessor of anything which can survive in his hands. The rights of the par-
ties "merely come to an end and vanish . . ... 79 Since a cancellation is not a
sale, reasoned the Tax Court, the payment to the lessor was a substitute for
rental payments under Hort, and thus ordinary income.80
Although the thrust of Hort seems to be toward the definition of "property,"
there is some language in the opinion which might be read as going to the issue
of "sale or exchange": "The cancellation of the lease involved nothing more
than relinquishment of the right to future rental payments in return for a present
substitute payment and possession of the leased premises."81 A reading of Hort
as involving the issue of "sale or exchange" seems strained and would appear to
be an attempt to avoid the problem of defining "property." However, a holding
of no "sale or exchange" because the right or asset transferred does not survive
in the hands of the transferee seems to be merely another way to define "prop-
erty"--as "an asset which survives the transaction,"--a definition which is in
no way related to the intent of Congress as expressed either in the legislative
history or as understood by the Supreme Court. Moreover, this approach ignores
the fact that the lessor does obtain something he did not have before the can-
cellation, albeit not the lease itself-the land free of the lease together with
an amount representing the value appreciation of the lessee's commitment to pay
rent. Common understanding seems to indicate that there has been a sale of
"property," characterized by one court in a case involving a lease favorable to
the lessee as "the right freely to lease."8s 2 However termed, a corresponding right
sold the real property for an amount equal to the value of the realty plus the value of the
appreciated lease, and then having bought identical realty without such a lease. The
difference between the selling and purchase price should be capital gain.
76. 313 U.S. at 33.
77. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-8(b) (1957), Spray Water Power & Land Co. v. Commissioner,
20 T.C.M. 353 (1961).
78. 20 T.C.M. 353 (1961).
79. Id. at 356.
80. Id. at 357; Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. in Macon, 157 F.2d 592, 593
(5th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 828.
81. 313 U.S. 28, 32 (1941).
82. Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390, 392 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829
(1954). In Ray, the lessee was paid for cancellation of a clause in the lease preventing the
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was sold in Hort by the lessor to the lessee. The issue should be whether such
property is a capital asset.83
Where the cancelled lease is favorable to the tenant because of a rise in the
rental market, both the "sale or exchange" and "property" issues have been
decided in favor of the tenant and a payment by the lessor to the tenant in can-
cellation of the lease gives the tenant capital gain.8 4 In Walter H. Sutliff,85 where
the lessee sold his interest not to the lessor, but to a third person, it was held that
the Hort principle did not apply since the tenant neither received anything on
account of future rent; nor was he the owner of the fee. In Commissioner v.
Golonsky,8 6 the Commissioner's position that a "cancellation or termination" is
not a sale was rejected, the Court noting that the amount paid to the lessee
must be amortized by the lessor over the life of the lease.87 In other words, the
landlord from leasing other parts of the building to competitors of the lessee. Rejecting the
position of the Commissioner that there was no sale because upon cancellation the restrictive
covenant vanishes, does not survive in the hands of the lessor, and thus cannot be the
subject of a sale, the Court adopted the following position:
A sale in the ordinary sense is a transfer of property for a fixed price in money or
its equivalent. Examine the circumstances here, the precedent condition, the trans-
action and the subsequent condition. Before the transaction the taxpayer had a
valuable property right, intangible but nonetheless property, a restrictive covenant
in his lease [imposing a servitude on the property] which prevented competition
in his trade or business. Before the transaction [which freed the property from this
servitude] the lessor lacked a valuable right, the right to lease its premises to
whomsoever it chose upon whatever terms it could arrange [and to sell it free of
the servitude]. True it had once possessed this right, but it had conveyed the right
for a consideration to the taxpayer. In the transaction the lessor gave its $20,000 to
the taxpayer and in exchange the taxpayer gave to the lessor what it had not im-
mediately theretofore possessed, the right to lease its premises to whomsoever it
chose at whatever terms it could arrange.
The Commissioner's position apparently depends upon a view that the
restrictive covenant when transferred or released to the covenantor simply
disappears, vanishes and becomes nothing and, therefore, cannot be the subject of
a sale. The concept, it seems, overlooks the substantial fact that it is the right freely
to lease that is the subject of the transaction. Intangible though the property may
be, it is real and valuable to both parties to the transaction [a servitude imposed
by] a restrictive covenant in the hands of the taxpayer, [an unburdened], a freely
exercisable right in the hands of the lessor. The commissioner's view conceives the
covenant as the thing and ignores the status of the intangible right [the servitude
it imposes] involved as the substance of the sale. . . .In the commissioner's view
property rights which disappear or, as he expresses it, vanish upon a relinquishment,
surrender or transfer cannot be the subject of a sale even though the transfer or
surrender or relinquishment for a consideration is that which, [by reuniting servient
and dominant estate] effects the vanishment. There is much authority to the
contrary [of these views].
210 F.2d at 391-92.
83. Disenchantment is setting in with the purely technical requirement of a sale or
exchange that a property interest survive the transaction. See text accompanying notes
254-59, infra.
84. Walter H. Sutliff, 46 B.TA. 446 (1942); Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72
(3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953); Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390
(5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954); Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Com-
missioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960); Cf. Rev. Rul. 60-4, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 303, holding
that a lease held by one who sub-leased the property and was not a dealer in leases was a§ 1231 asset because it had more than thirty years to run and thus was "real property" used
in the trade or business; Voloudakis v. Commissioner, 274 F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1960).
85. 46 B.T.A. 446 (1942).
86. 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cerl. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953).
87. Id. at 74.
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lease is "acquired" by the lessor and "survives" the transaction. Also, in holding
the lease to be "property"88 heavy reliance was placed upon the cases, direct
descendants of Blair, holding that a transfer by a life tenant of his interest in a
trust is a transfer of a capital asset.8 9 Hort was distinguished because the lessee
received no money on account of rent.90 The same result obtained in Commis-
sioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc.,9 ' the Court distinguishing cases deal-
ing with the release of exclusive agency contracts 2 where no sale or exchange
was found because the contractual right was not transferred, but was released
and merely vanished. A lease, said the Court, is a more substantial property right
which does not go out of existence upon a transfer whether the transfer be to a
third person or to the lessor.93 Hort was again distinguished upon the ground
that the payment to the lessee does not represent future rentals.94 In Commis-
sioner v. Ray,95 where a non-competition clause in a lease was cancelled, the
Fifth Circuit completely rejected the Commissioner's position that since the re-
strictive covenant did not survive the transaction there was no "sale." The
Court adopted for its holding the argument of the taxpayer that the "right to
lease" is the subject of the transaction and that this right was transferred by the
cancellation. 0 In Metropolitan Building Co.97 two transactions were involved.
Taxpayer was a lessee and in one transaction cancelled a portion of the lease
with his lessor, the sub-tenant paying for the cancellation. Although the under-
lying leasehold had been cancelled, the Tax Court held that the gain to the
taxpayer was ordinary income since the value of the leasehold was entirely at-
tributable to the sub-lease, and, reasoned the Court, taxpayer had merely re-
ceived a substitute for future rents payable under the sub-lease. Hort therefore
controlled. 8 In the second transaction, the taxpayer sold his entire remaining
leasehold interest, including the sub-leases, to a third party for a lump sum
consideration. The gain was held to be capital gain even though the lease had
only ten months to run, and the sales price was based upon the net rentals due
under the sub-leases. The Tax Court refused to apply Commissioner v. P. G.
Lake, Inc., 9 then recently decided, on the ground that taxpayer had retained no
88. Id. at 73, 74. See also, Rev. Rul. 60-4, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 303, which holds that a
lease held by one who is not a dealer in leases is a section 1231 asset because it had more
than thirty years to run and thus was "real property" used in the trade or business and
capital gain was allowable on its sale.
89. Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943); McAllister v. Com-
missioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
90. Lipsitz v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 871, 874 (4th Cir. 1955).
91. 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954).
92. See text accompanying notes 238-326, infra.
93. 210 F.2d at 753.
94. Ibid.
95. 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954).
96. Id. at 392.
97. 31 T.C. 971 (1959) acq., 1959-2 Cum. Bull. 6, rev'd, in part, Metropolitan Bldg.
Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
98. 31 T.C. at 977-78.
99. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
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reversion in the property.'LOO It also rejected the argument that an ordinary in-
come result was called for because the amount received was based upon the
future rentals to be produced by the sub-leases: "[T]he earning power of the
income-producing property will almost always be a factor determining its fair
market value."''1
The Tax Court's treatment of the two transactions in Metropolitan Build-
ing Co. seems inconsistent. Gain from both transactions was attributable to the
anticipated rentals from the sub-leases. The difference in result is apparently
based only on the fact that payment in the first transaction had been made by
the sub-tenant rather than the lessor. On appeal' 02 the Tax Court was reversed
as to its holding on the first transaction, the Court holding that the controlling
fact was the transfer of the leasehold in its entirety rather than the person of
the payor.10 3 The gain from both transactions was capital gain.
In summary, cancellation of a lease gives capital gain to the lessee and
ordinary income to the lessor. The influence of Horst makes the difference in
treatment seem to turn solely upon the fact that the lessor also owns the rever-
sion in the property. For this reason he is held to receive payments in the nature
of future rents and not to have sold "property," which is also expressed in the
rationale that there has been no "sale or exchange." However, the "future in-
come" analysis does not distinguish the situation of the lessee from that of the
lessor. The future income rationale in Hort is based merely on the fact that the
receipt represents the value of future rents, which, on receipt, would be ordinary
income. The receipt by the lessee on the cancellation of a lease is also "future
ordinary income" in that it represents the absence of a cost item which will be
reflected in the amount of ordinary business income which would not have been
offset by a rent deduction. Furthermore, where as in Metropolitan Building Co.
the lessee is also in the position of the landlord because he is in turn sub-leasing
the property, the cancellation of his lease does give him gain which in the Hort
sense is future ordinary income. But as Metropolitan Building Co. indicates,
that fact by itself makes no difference and the lessee is given capital gain. Clearly
then, the "future income" rationale is also irrelevant to the nature of gain to
the lessor. Recognition of this fact will permit focus on the issue of whether the
lessor has converted an investment.
With regard to the sale or exchange issue, the courts, except for Ray, have
made the difference in treatment between the lessor and lessee depend upon
property notions. Because the lease transfer to the landlord is a traditional
property interest and "survives" in the hands of the landlord rather than vanish-
ing or terminating, it is held there has been a sale of property. Since 1954, a
lessee is guaranteed "sale or exchange" treatment by section 1241. However, a
payment to the lessor for cancellation is a payment merely for the release of
100. 31 T.C. at 980.
101. Ibid.
102. Metropolitan Bldg. ,Co. v. Commissioner, 282 F.2d 592 (9th Cir. 1960).
103. Id. at 594.
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the obligation to pay rent; a termination, an extinction, with nothing surviving
in the hands of the lessor. That preferential taxation, which is based upon the
conversion of a long time investment, should turn upon such a property concept
seems improper, and, as will be seen in the cases dealing with exclusive agency
and distributorship contracts, it is being less and less stressed by the courts. 04
"Carved-Out" Interests: The P. G. Lake Doctrine
The Supreme Court continued its "future ordinary income" rationale in
Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc.105 where the owner of a working interest in oil
and gas leases sold an oil payment right' 0 6 of 600,000 dollars in consideration of
cancellation of a debt in that amount. At the time of the sale it was reasonably
certain that the oil payment right would pay out in three or more years and it did
in fact pay out in a little more than three years. The Court, stating that the
capital gain provisions are to be narrowly construed "to relieve the taxpayer
from excessive tax burdens on gains resulting from a conversion of capital in-
vestments, and to remove the deterrent effect of those burdens on such conver-
sions,1 °1O7 held the receipt to be ordinary income.
We do not see here any conversion of a capital investment. The lump
sum consideration seems essentially a substitute for what would other-
wise be received at a future time as ordinary income. The pay-out of
these particular assigned oil payment rights could be ascertained with
considerable accuracy'108
The Court emphasized the "future income" rationale:
The substance of what was assigned was the right to receive future in-
come. The substance of what was received was the present value of
104. See text accompanying notes 254-59, infra.
105. 356 U.S. 260 (1958).
106. The Supreme Court described the terms "working interest" and "oil payment"
as follows:
An oil and gas lease ordinarily conveys the entire mineral interest less any royalty
interest retained by the lessor. The owner of the lease is said to own the "working
interest" because he has the right to develop and produce the minerals.
In Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, we described an oil payment as "the
right to a specified sum of money, payable out of a specified percentage of the
oil, or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil, if, as and when produced.
Id. at 410. A royalty interest is "a right to receive a specified percentage of all
oil and gas produced" but, unlike the oil payment, is not limited to a specified sum
of money. The royalty interest lasts during the entire term of the lease. Id. at 409.
356 U.S. at 261-62 n.1.
A further description of an "oil payment" is contained in Lyon & Eustice, supra
note 50, at 302, n.35:
The term is typically an in rem right to receive a stated fraction of oil produced
from a property for a limited period of time or until a specified sum of money (or
a specified number of barrels of oil) has been received. The term "carved out"
means that the oil payment is sold by a person who retains an interest in the
mineral property subject to the rights of the grantee of the oil payment. An oil
payment may be carved out of a royalty interest, a working interest, or from a
larger oil payment, with the grantor retaining in effect a reversionary interest
in the property. The first two of these situations were present in Lake and were
treated alike.
107. 356 U.S. at 265.
108. Ibid.
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income which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future. In
short, consideration was paid for the right to receive future income,
not for an increase in the value of the income-producing property.10
The Court then went on to place heavy reliance upon Clifford, Schafiner, and
especially on Horst, quoting extensively from Horst regarding "enjoyment of
fruits" of labor or investment by disposing of the right of collection. 110
The Court considered the interest sold as "fruit" rather than "tree" and
therefore not a capital asset. This analysis, together with the Court's lengthy
quotation of I. T. 4,003,111 indicates an intent upon the part of the Court to
embrace the Commissioner's position therein stated. 1 2 Under that position,
assignment of an oil payment right, no matter how long or short lived it may
be, which extends over a period less than the life of the property interest re-
tained by the transferor is an assignment of future ordinary income and will
not receive capital gain treatment. But, if what is assigned is not a "horizontal
slice" but a so-called "vertical slice"--that is, the entire interest of the assignor
in the property or a fraction of his interest extending over the entire life of the
property-then a capital asset-the "tree," or a fractional part of it-will have
been transferred.
By adopting the Commissioner's position and by its heavy reliance on the
assignment of income cases, the Court is determining the meaning of "property"
under Section 1221 by way of the "fruit-tree" metaphor. Capital gains treatment
turns on whether or not the assignor retains a reversion in the property assigned.
An assignment will receive capital gains treatment if it consists of the assignor's
entire interest in the property even though that interest be merely an oil payment
(e.g., the assignor sells his longer lived interest first while retaining an oil pay-
ment which he later sells; or, similarly, a purchaser of an oil payment
109. Id. at 266.
110. Id. at 267.
111. 1950-1 Cum. Bull. 10. I.T. 4,003 states:
.. . the assignment of any in-oil payment right (not pledged for development),
which extends over a period less than the life of the depletable property interest
from which it is carved, is essentially the assignment of expected income from
such property interest. Therefore, the assignment for a consideration of any such
in-oil payment right results in the receipt of ordinary income by the assignor which
is taxable to him when received or accrued, depending upon the method of ac-
counting employed by him. Where the assignment of the in-oil payment right is
donative, the transaction is considered as an assignment of future income which
is taxable to the donor at such time as the income from the assigned payment right
arises.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, G.C.M. 24849, supra, and I.T. 3935, supra, do
not apply [i.e., capital gain will result] where the assigned in-oil payment right
constitutes the entire depletable interest of the assignor in the property or a fraction
extending over the entire life of the property.
1950-1 Cum. Bull. at 11.
112. The Tax Court, in strictly applying Lake in assigned oil payment cases, Estate
of 0. W. Killiam, 33 T.C. 345 (1959) ; J. G. Dyer, 34 T.C. 513 (1960), aff'd, 294 F.2d 123(10th Cir. 1961); Jay H. Floyd, 20 T.C.M. 303 (1961), aff'd per curiam, 309 F.2d 95 (5th
Cir. 1962), has noted the reliance of the Supreme Court on the Commissioner's position in
I.T. 4003 and has strongly implied that the Court has adopted that position as a test. Estate
of 0. W. Killiarn, supra, at 348.
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sells it for a gain thus assigning his whole interest), or if it consists of a
vertically cut oil payment (a payment which pays out simultaneously with the
retained fraction), or of the "tail end" fraction of a horizontally cut oil payment
(a payment which pays out after the retained portion).113 On the other hand,
if the interest transferred is a "carve-out"; that is, an interest which is shorter
lived than the interest which is retained and from which the assigned interest
derives, then no capital asset has been transferred.
The result in Lake is undoubtedly correct. To allow capital gains for the
sale of the oil payment would clearly have dealt a substantial blow to the ordinary
income status of oil royalties. However, to rationalize the result on the "future
ordinary income" theory is dangerous in the other direction since, carried to
its logical extremes, that doctrine would signal the end of capital gains on the
sale of any property. As recognized by the Court in Lake, Congress intended
capital gain treatment only upon the conversion of a capital investment. The
notion of "conversion" is usually expressed in the "sale or exchange" require-
ment.114 A transfer of an insubstantial number of one's total bundle of rights
in a physical asset is held not to be a sale but a lease or a license.115 The trans-
action in Lake can be viewed as not having been a "sale or exchange." However,
since there was a disposition of some interest in property,1 6 the problem can
also be approached in ternis of whether what was disposed of was the taxpayer's
"investment." Although the Supreme Court twice stated there had been no con-
version of a capital investment, 117 its use of the "future ordinary income" ratio-
nale is confusing. The Court could simply have found that the taxpayer's invest-
ment in Lake was not in the oil payment; rather, it was in the working interest
retained by the assignor. The oil payment in Lake has been analogized to the
interest acquired by the lessee of real property who acquires merely the right to
the use of the property for a limited period. A "sale" of the lease to the lessee
by the owner of the fee is by no means a conversion of his investment in the real
estate.118 Likewise, in Lake there was only a single investment, in the working
113. See generally, Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 307-09; Simon, Supreme
Court Says No to Capital Gain Treatment of Carved-Out Oil Payments, 37 Taxes 61,
62 (1959).
114. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1222(3).
115. Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 328.
116. See Commissioner v. Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S.
829 (1954), discussed in text accompanying notes 82, 95, 96, supra; McAllister v. Com-
missioner, 157 F.2d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1946).
117. 356 U.S. at 265, 268.
118. Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 328; Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 29, 30;
Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932), and other cases cited in Lyon & Eustice, supra,
p. 327, 328, notes 139-142; Aircraft Mechanics, Inc., 30 T.C. 1227 (1958); Theodore E.
Moberg, 35 T.C. 773 (1961), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 310 F.2d 782 (9th Cir.
1962); Kurlan v. Commissioner, 343 F.2d 625 (2d Cir. 1965).
The lessor is, of course, entitled to deductions for depredation in order to replace
the "wasting" of the premises in the hands of the tenant. The assignor of the oil payment
recovers the "wasting" of his longer lived interest, due to production operations, through
the depletion deduction.
The argument can be made that a sale of a lease to a lessee is a sale of the "invest-
ment" since the value of at least that portion of the investment in the real estate will be
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interest, which was not terminated by the sale of the oil payment. This situation
is entirely different from that in Hort. There, the lessor was not engaging in the
periodic anticipation of income from his investment in the real estate; on the
contrary, he was entirely liquidating his investment in a quite different asset, the
lease, which had a value independent of the realty due to a decline in value of
the leased premises. In the Lake situation, the emphasis should be on the lack
of termination of investment. In Gillette Motor Transport, Inc.119 the Court made
this point without confusing it with the "future ordinary income" rationale.
Although it relied on Lake and Hort in holding that compensation for condemna-
tion by the government of the use of taxpayers transportation facilities was
ordinary income, the Court's emphasis was on the fact that no "investment" had
been converted. Admitting that the right to use the transport facilities was
"property," that right was not itself the investment.120
Another line of analysis suggested by the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Lake is that of "investment risk.' 1 2 1 The Court stressed that the pay out of the
assigned oil payment rights could be ascertained with considerable accuracy and
that in fact one such payment had been used to secure a loan of almost its face
amount of ten million dollars.122 The lack of any risk to the purchaser of the oil
payment indicates absence of any investment having been sold or purchased.
No funds had been placed "at risk.' 123 Would the result in Lake have been
otherwise if the assignor's retained interest had been unproved or speculative?
used up by the lessee. Likewise with the oil payment in Lake; in a very real sense, the
assignor sold a portion of the oil in place, which is in fact treated as an interest In land
under local law. However, this reasoning would eliminate entirely from ordinary income
treatment rents and royalties which are anticipated in advance of use or production.
Therefore, the courts refuse to allow capital gains to one who periodically anticipates
income without terminating his investment so as, e.g., to sell for rent the use of the
property for a day, a week, a month, etc. Furthermore, such reasoning could be self-
defeating; in the above examples, it would lead to the result that the use of land and the
oil in place would be "property held for sale to customers" which is excluded from capital
gain treatment by Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(1).
119. 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
120. That right is not something in which respondent had any investment,
separate and apart from its investment in the physical assets themselves. Respondent
suggests no method by which a cost basis could be assigned to the right; yet it is
necessary, in determining the amount of gain realized for purposes of § 117,
to deduct the basis of the property sold, exchanged, or involuntarily converted from
the amount received. § 111(a). Further, the right is manifestly not of the type
which gives rise to the hardship of the realization in one year of an advance in
value over cost built up in several years, which is what Congress sought to
ameliorate by the capital-gains provisions . . . . In short, the right to use is not a
capital asset, but is simply an incident of the underlying physical property, the
recompense for which is commonly regarded as rent.
Id. at 135. Compare, Terminal S.S. Co., 34 T.C. 915 (1960); Rev. Rul. 58-296, 1958-1 Cum.
Bull. 276; Rev. Rul. 61-18, 1961-1 Cum. Bull. 5; Weyerhaeuser S.S. Co. v. United States,
192 F. Supp. 615 (W.D. Wash. 1961).
121. "If 'investment' is the placing of funds at risk, the question of whether the
taxpayer in selling a right has anticipated income or actually sold part or all of an in-
vestment would seem to depend on whether or not he has transferred a substantial risk
to the buyer." Comment, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 737, 742-43 (1956).
122. 356 U.S. at 265.
123. See Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 306.
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This question arose in Ortiz Oil Co.,124 decided long before Lake. The owner of
oil leases on undeveloped property was held to have received capital gain on the
sale of a 359,000 dollars oil payment for 154,000 dollars. Both the Board and the
Court of Appeals characterized the interest sold as a sale of oil in place. Such a
"property" anaysis would not seem capable of surviving Lake. There was, how-
ever, a risk factor because of the highly speculative nature of the interest sold.
Since Lake, the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Foster 25 has stated that this
factor must be taken into consideration and capital gains will result on the sale
of a carved-out oil payment if the pay out of the oil payment cannot be predicted
with reasonable accuracy.120 Indeed, the Court was very critical of the position
taken by the Commissioner, some courts, and legal writers which applies the
".carve-out" rule in its most literal sense. 127 The Court then went on to find that
the pay out of the oil payment could have been predicted with reasonable ac-
curacy and, therefore, called for ordinary income treatment.
While the taxpayer lost, the Foster reading of Lake considerably narrows
its reach and is more pertinent to the policies of capital gains taxation than
notions of "carve-out" and "future income." If the pay out of the oil payment is
not reasonably certain then the payment is treated as extending over the
entire life of the interest from which it was carved, and is treated as a royalty
interest. 128 This, of course, would be the sale of a "vertical slice," which clearly
indicates the conversion of the investment in a fraction of the property, and
capital gains treatment is called for. When Lake is viewed as involving the
conversion of an investment risk, neither the "future income" nor the "carve-
out" theory is necessary to a proper result and they are better discarded. Both
theories suggest that retention of a reversion which consists of part of the
property from which the assignment is made is fatal to capital gains treatment.
Such a notion impedes proper analysis of a situation such as that in Hort where
lessor's gain due to the value appreciation of the lease is separate and distinct
124. 37 B.T.A. 656 (1938).
125. 324 F.2d 702 (1963).
126. In the words of the Court:
... the assignment of an oil payment (not pledged for development), which extends
over a period less than the life of the depletable property interest from which it is
carved, results in ordinary income if the pay-out of the oil payment can be
predicted with reasonable accuracy at the time of the sale. Pay-out of an oil pay-
ment carved from producing property can be predicted with reasonable accuracy if
it is not unreasonable to conclude that total reserves and the amount of production
dedicated to pay-out are adequate for that purpose. For undeveloped property,
however, an additional determination is necessary, i.e., that adequate pay-out
production reasonably can be expected from the property.
Id. at 708.
127. No rule was established by Lake requiring all carved out interests to be taxed
as ordinary income simply upon a finding that they were carved out and that the
price received was not pledged for development. The substance and effect of the
whole transaction must be examined; form alone will not control. Nevertheless,
the Commissioner, some courts, and legal writers continue to espouse definitions
and rules as to ordinary income or capital gain couched in terms of whether an
interest is carved out or not.
Id. at 706.
128. United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781 (1963).
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from any value in the underlying realty. Also, it prevents capital gain treatment
under the reasoning of Foster, where there is real "risk" involved in the sale
and purchase of future profits. On the other hand, where no reversion is retained
by a transferor and any investment held will necessarily have been converted,
the "future income" theory may still be applied to prevent capital gain. There
would appear to be no danger of this occurring where the asset sold is a "tradi-
tional" capital asset, such as stocks, bonds or real estate. However, the danger
is a real one in the atypical case. An example is Wilkinson v. United States12
which is worthy of discussion in some detail. Taxpayer, a lawyer, bought an
interest in a contingent legal fee. The seller of the fee, a Captain Bonnin,
although not a lawyer, in 1932 had been authorized by the Secretary of the
Interior to represent certain of the Ute Indians in the prosecution of claims
against the United States under a contract whereby Bonnin was to receive a fee
of no more than 10 percent of any recovery. Apparently unable to provide the
legal services himself, in 1935 Bonnin assigned the major portion of his interest
in the contract to a firm of lawyers of which taxpayer was a member, and, in
fact, taxpayer performed the legal services which eventually resulted in a
recovery. Besides his interest in the contingent fee for which he was to perform
services, in 1938 taxpayer purchased from Bonnin, and in 1950 from Bonnin's
widow, a portion of Bonnin's reserved interest in the contingent fee. In 1951,
after a judgment for almost 32 million dollars had been entered for the Ute
Indians, but before the Court had fixed attorney fees, taxpayer sold for 73,000
dollars his interest in a portion of the fee which he had purchased for 16,000
dollars. In holding that the gain was ordinary income, the Court of Claims
relied heavily on its decision in Arnield v. United States,130 which had relied in
part upon Lake to hold that gain on the sale of an annuity policy was a sub-
stitute for matured ordinary income and hence not capital gain. The proposition
derived by the Court from Arnfeld was that in determining whether gain is a
capital gain in the hands of the assignee, one must look at the nature of the
income that would have resulted had there been no assignment. Since the fee
would have been ordinary income to Bonnin had he collected it, reasoned the
Court, the claim remained an ordinary income asset in the hands of Bonnin's
assignee, the taxpayer, and a sale did not change the nature of the gain from
ordinary income to capital gain. "Were we to hold otherwise," said the Court:
we can visualize countless opportunities for individuals performing
personal services to exploit this method of limiting their tax responsi-
bilities. For example, two lawyers, each working on a contingent fee
contract, might sell to the other the right to receive payment under their
contract for a nominal sum. They would then aver that the gain realized
was a capital gain because it represented gain on the sale or exchange
of property. 131
129. 157 Ct. C1. 847, 304 F.2d 469 (1962).
130. 143 Ct. CI. 277, 163 F. Supp. 865 (1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 943 (1959).
131. 157 Ct. C1. at 857, 304 F.2d at 474.
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The Court of Claims seems to have extended the "future income" rationale
to the full extent of its logical possibilities. The position that the character of
income cannot be changed by assignment would, of course, prevent capital gain
treatment on the sale of stocks, bonds and real estate on the ground that the
amount received representing future dividends, interest and rents must remain
ordinary income. Nor can the rationale be sustained on the ground that a mere
right to collect money which is not embodied in some traditional "property"
such as stocks, bonds or real estate, is not a capital asset. The cases have ex-
plicitly recognized that such a right can be the subject of speculation and risk-
taking and hence can be an investment asset. 132 Under these cases, and under any
sensible view of what is an investment, the taxpayer in Wilkinson had made an
investment. He bought his interests in the contingent fee for investment. Al-
though the second interest was purchased in 1950, apparently just before the
favorable decision when its value was less speculative than that of the interest
purchased in 1938, as to both interests the amount of the recovery and fee were
unknown. Taxpayer took the risk of gain or loss. The sale of his rights just
prior to the time in 1951 when the fee was set was a conversion of an investment.
Nor is the Court's example of two lawyers swapping fees persuasive. Besides
being highly unrealistic, each fee received would seem to represent the value of
the personal services rendered by the recipient to the other lawyer and would
be treated as received for such services rather than for the nominal sum "in-
vested." Hence, no capital asset would have been sold.1 33 Also, the Court's
reliance on the Arnfeld and on Cotlow v. Commissioner,34 cases seems mis-
placed. These cases do not support the proposition that what would be ordinary
income on receipt by the assignor remains ordinary income to the assignee. In
Cotlow the purchaser of insurance renewal commissions was held to have ordinary
income on receipt of commissions in excess of his cost but only because the
collection of the commissions was not a sale or exchange, not because of the
nature of the receipt in the hands of the assignor. Indeed, the Court made the
point explicit that taxpayer had collected the commissions and had never sold
132. In Pacific Finance Corporation of California, 22 P-H Tax Ct. Mem. 391 (1953),
taxpayer, a finance company, paid $450,000 for the right to receive the first $550,000 profits
realized on the distribution of the motion picture "Rebecca." After receiving $375,000, it
sold its interest in the profits of the film for $177,000. Refusing to apply the Hort rationale
to these facts, and characterizing the asset as an "investment", id. at 396, the Tax Court
held the gain was capital gain. In Ayrton Metal Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 741 (2d Cir.
1962), where taxpayer sold his interest in a joint venture which was engaged in the
purchase and sale of ore from a particular mine, the interest being a right to share in the
future profits of the venture, the Court held his gain was capital gain, expressly stating that
the right to future, uncertain profits is a capital asset. Id. at 749. A like result obtained in
Pat O'Brien, 25 T.C. 376 (1955) where there was a sale of a right to the profits from a
motion picture. Also, the Commissioner has held that the sale of bond coupons acquired
independently of the bonds produces capital gain. Rev. Rul. 54-251, 1954-2 Cum. Bull.
172. And the reasoning of United States v. Foster, 324 F.2d 702 (5th Cir. 1963), that the
sale of a carved-out oil payment will result in capital gains if the payout of the oil
payment cannot be predicted with reasonable accuracy recognizes the place of the risk
factor in determining whether an investment has been sold.
133. See text accompanying notes 220-28 infra.
134. 228 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1955).
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any of them. In Arnfeld, where the Court of Claims held that taxpayer's gain
on the sale of an annuity policy was taxable as ordinary income, the result
followed from the "accrued income" 1 35 doctrine under which payment received as
a substitute for matured ordinary income in the nature of interest is not capital
gain. Arnfeld did not involve the assignee's tax, but the result would be the same
as in Cotlow on collection of the annuity because of the lack of a "sale or ex-
change."' 36
In Wilkinson, the literal application of the Hort-Lake "future income"
theory brought about a most questionable result. Further evidence of the con-
fusion caused by this rationale will be seen in two recent decisions of the Tax
Court, which will be discussed in the next section in connection with the problem
of "accrued income."
Original Issue Discount and "Accrued" Income
Recently, the Supreme Court had to deal with another stubborn problem
in the capital asset definitional spectrum. In United States v. Midland-Ross
Corp.'37 the Court was faced with the problem of whether gain on the sale of
non-interest bearing promissory notes purchased at a discount was capital gain
or ordinary income. Refusing to follow the long-standing authority of Commis-
sioner v. Caulkins 38 that such gain was capital gain, the Court held that original
issue discount was not gain representing appreciation in value, but simply ordi-
nary income for the use or forbearance of money. The Court equated earned
original issue discount with accrued stated interest.18 9 The ordinary income
135. See text accompanying notes 137-49, infra.
136. Wilkinson may be viewed as involving the "accrued income" doctrine. On this
point, compare, Doyle v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 769 (4th Cir. 1945) involving not a sale
but an assignment by gift by the taxpayer to his wife and children of a percentage of a
breach of contract claim which had cost the assignor $928.75 and resulted in a payment of$34,926.01. In holding that the assignor remained taxable on the proceeds, the Court
stressed the "ripeness" of the claim when it was assigned, the intra-family transfer and the
assignor's practical retained control. This case at best is doubtful authority for the applica-
tion of the "accrued income" rationale to assignment of an asset which, as in Wilkinson,
had appreciated due to "risk" factors rather than buildup of ordinary income items such
as interest. This distinction is clearly made in Friedman v. Commissioner, 346 F.2d 506(6th Cir. 1965) where the assignor could not avoid the tax on payments representing the
value of an endowment policy attributable to annual interest additions to the value of the
policy. See also the discussion of the cases involving sale of accrued income items in the
next section. Compare Doyle, with Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962).
137. 391 U.S. 54 (1965).
138. 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944). Contrary to Caulkins, and in accord with the
decision in Midland Ross are the following: Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68 (1965);
Real Estate Inv. Trust of America v. Commissioner, 334 F.2d 986 (1st Cir. 1964); Jaglom
v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1962) ; United States v. Harrison, 304 F.2d 835 (5th
Cir. 1962); Rosen v. United States, 288 F.2d 658 (3d .Cir. 1961); Commissioner v. Morgan,
272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Fisher v. Commissioner, 209 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1954).
139. The $6 earned on a one-year note for $106 issued for $100 is precisely like
the $6 earned on a one-year loan of $100 at 6% stated interest. The application
of general principles would indicate, therefore, that earned original issue discount,
like stated interest, should be taxed ... as ordinary income.
381 U.S. 54, 58 (1965).
This problem no longer arises since Int. Rev. Code of 1954, section 1232(a)(2)
provides, in substance, that any portion of the gain attributable to the original issue
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result was based upon the Court's usual canon of construction that the term
"capital asset" must be construed narrowly so as to apply only to value ap-
preciation accrued over a period of time, citing Gillette Motor Transport and
Corn Products, and not to apply to property representing "income items or ac-
cretions to the value of a capital asset themselves properly attributable to in-
come,' 140 citing Hort and Lake. However, in both Hort and Lake, the Court
was concerned with the present realization of the value of future income. In
Midland-Ross, there was involved quite a different facet of the problem which
arises where items of income have "accrued" in the past and are realized by
a sale of both the principle obligation and the accrued items. Unlike Lake and
Hort, here there is no sale of "future income" and a retention of the "property"
since the transferor has parted with his entire interest in the property. Because
the taxpayer's investment has entirely ended, and any investment gain has been
converted, the principles of Hort, Lake, and Gillette Motor Transport have no
direct application. The question of termination of interest was not involved in
Midland-Ross and the only question before the Court was whether taxpayer's
gain was due to appreciation in value of his investment. The Court properly
held that gain due to original issue discount is not gain due to appreciation. It is
simply the amount earned by the investment up to the time of the sale and
therefore is not a capital gain. 141
The result in Midland-Ross reflects the basic position of most courts that
where both the income producing asset and the right to accrued income from
asset are sold together the purchase price must be allocated between the two and
only the former is a capital asset.142 In Midland-Ross, the Supreme Court spe-
cifically approved this view, stating that the amount received on sale or retire-
ment of the discount note must be broken down into its component parts.143 This
principle has generally been applied to deny capital asset status to "matured"
or "accrued" earnings of property. 44 Thus, on a sale of an interest in a partner-
ship, a portion of the proceeds received for accrued partnership income is ordi-
nary income;' 45 where stock upon which a dividend has accrued is sold, that
part of the purchase price allocable to the value of the dividend is ordinary
income.' 40 Likewise, in the case of sales of life insurance policies, endowment
discount will be treated as ordinary income. This provision does not apply to bonds or
notes issued before January 1, 1955, such as the notes involved in Midland Ross Corp.
140. 381 U.S. at 57.
141. After saying this, unhappily, the Court again relied on its "future ordinary income"
language from Hort. 381 U.S. at 58.
142. Jaglom v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 847, 850 (2d Cir. 1962).
143. Citing Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945) and Watson v. Com-
missioner, 345 U.S. 544, 552 (1953).
144. See generally Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 358-73, Jaglom v. Commissioner,
303 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1962).
145. United States v. Snow, 223 F.2d 103 (9th Cir. 1955), Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d
590 (2d Cir. 1937), Tunnell v. United States, 259 F.2d 916 (3d Cir. 1958). These cases arose
before the same result was required by specific provision in the Internal Revenue Code of
1954, §§ 741, 751.
146. Reg. § 1.61-9(c) (1957), Brundage v. United States, 275 F.2d 424 (7th Cir.
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policies, and annuity contracts immediately prior to their maturity, courts have
found that the portion of the selling price allocable to the accrued income will
not receive capital gain treatment.147 And amounts representing accrued motion
picture rentals likewise are ordinary income. 148 In a slightly different context,
involving the application of section 337, the sale by a cash basis corporation of
fully performed contracts resulted in ordinary income.149
A problem similar to that of the sale of "accrued income" arises where
property is sold for deferred payments and there is no allocation of the sale
price for an interest element. This is so even though the longer the deferment,
the greater the price the seller will demand because of the delay in payment.
Congress has recently legislated to require an appropriate part of the deferred
payments to be treated as interest both to the seller and the buyer as to sales
or exchanges after June 1963.15
In a recent case the Tax Court seems to have carried the "accrued income"
rationale too far. In Donald B. Jones'8 ' the taxpayer had purchased, as a specu-
lative investment, a contingent trust remainder interest in a specific dollar
amount. After the occurrence of the contingency and upon the vesting of the
remainder interest the taxpayer sold his right to the specific dollar amount at
a substantial gain. The gain was held to be ordinary income because had tax-
payer merely collected the amount from the trustee he would have had ordinary
income; also, this income had already accrued. The Tax Court relied upon
Jaglom v. Commissioner,52 which dealt with accrued bond interest, and upon
the principle of Lake that the taxpayer had received a substitute for future
ordinary income. This seems clearly to be an erroneous application of the "ac-
crued income" doctrine. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Midland-Ross,
earned original issue discount is simply compensation for the use or forbearance
of money. "Unlike the typical case of capital appreciation, the earnings of dis-
count to maturity is predictable and measurable, and is 'essentially a substitute
for . . . payments which . . . must be regarded as ordinary income, ...' ,,)M5
In Donald B. Jones, however, the gain was in no way attributable to predictable
and measurable earnings such as interest; on the contrary it represented appre-
ciation of taxpayers investment in the remainder interest due to its ripening
into a vested interest upon the death of the life tenant.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 831 (1961), discussed in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 123, at
366-69.
147. See discussion in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 369-71. The Tax Court now
agrees with this result even as to endowment policies, which it had held in Percy W.
Phillips, 30 T.C. 866 (1958), rev'd, 275 F.2d 33 (4th Cir. 1960), to give rise to capital gain.
Boiling Jones, Jr., 39 T.C. 404 (1962), Abram Nesbitt, 43 T.C. 629 No. 50 (1965). Com-
pare the position taken in Comment, supra note 19, at 564-67.
148. Bessie Lasky, 22 T.C. 13 (1954).
149. Commissioner v. Kuckenherg, 309 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1962); Family Record
Plan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 208 (9th Cir. 1962).
150. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 483.
151. 40 T.C. 249 (1963).
152. jaglom v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1962).
153. United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. at 57.
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On appeal, Donald B. Jones was reversed by the Third Circuit 5 4 and re-
manded to the Tax Court to allocate the purchase price between the value
attributable to interest income and that attributable to the capital gain com-
ponent-presumably appreciation. The Court of Appeals seemed to recognize
that taxpayer's purchase discount involved the traditional type of discount which
can give rise to capital gain-as in the case of gain received when a bond pur-
chased at a depressed market price is redeemed at par.155 But why any portion
of the gain was allocable to interest income is puzzling. There would seem to be
involved only "market discount" as distinguished from "original issue discount."
In Donald B. Jones, the Tax Court seems to have been overly influenced
by both the "accrued income" cases and also the future income rationale of
Lake. The Lake influence was also predominant in Merchants Acceptance Co. 56
where taxpayer sold at a gain certain notes receivable it had acquired at a dis-
count. At the time of the sale, the discount and/or interest element was not yet
earned or accruable.' 57 The Tax Court nevertheless held, assuming the notes
were not disqualified from capital asset status by section 1221 (4), that the gain
represented nothing more than the commutated value of taxpayer's right to earn
future ordinary income in the form of interest. Thus, held the Court, under
Lake:
... the substance of what is sold is the right to receive future income,
and the substance of what is received is the present value of that income
which the recipient would otherwise obtain in the future .... 158
As in Wilkinson, the Lake rationale has been carried to its logical extreme so as
to convert into ordinary income the normal appreciation due to market factors in
an admittedly capital asset. Such reasoning, by denying capital gain treatment
to the receipt of future unearned income, would require ordinary income treat-
ment in such traditionally capital gain transactions as sales of real estate, stock,
and especially bonds.159
Sales of Life Estates
The capital asset definitional problem has arisen in one of its most graphic
forms where there has been a sale by a life tenant of his life interest in prop-
154. Jones v. Commissioner, 330 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1964).
155. United States v. Harrison, 304 F.2d 835, 838 (5th Cir. 1962). "The gain realized
from such a transaction is a form of capital appreciation that resembles the capital gain
received when stock or real estate is purchased and later sold at a profit, in contrast to an
original issue discount gain which represents the interest or compensation paid for the use
of money loaned." The distinction is between "market discount" and "original issue dis-
count." For examples and discussion of this distinction, see Lubin v. Commissioner, 335
F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1964); Rev. Rul. 60-210, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 38; and Eustice, Contract
Rights, Capital Gaiz, and Assignment of Income-The Ferrer Case, 20 Tax L. Rev. 1, 20(1964).
156. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 896 (1964).
157. This fact is not too clear from the opinion. The court quotes from the Com-
missioner's pleading which stated that the gain consisted exclusively of "unamortized
discount (deferred income)." 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 897-98. See Eustice, supra note 155,
at 21.
158. 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. at 899.
159. See Eustice supra note 155, at 22.
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erty. 160 Take for example the owner of a fee in rental real estate who deeds the
remainder, reserving a life interest. Later he sells the life estate to the remainder-
man. Is the receipt a return of capital with any gain being capital gain, or is it
ordinary income? Is capital treatment prevented by lack of a "sale or exchange?"
If gain is capital, is the seller entitled to have any part of the overall basis of
the property allocated to the life estate? If so, how is that basis to be determined?
Is the remainderman entitled to amortize the cost of the life estate over the life
expectancy of the seller?
The courts have held that such a sale by a life tenant is a sale of a capital
asset and that the life tenant is entitled to a basis in the life estate.1 ' In Bell's
Estate v. Commissioner6 2 where a court of appeals was first faced with the ques-
tion, the Court had to decide between two competing lines of authority. Blair,
which held that a life interest in property was "property" the assignment of which
shifted the tax to the assignee, was a logical candidate to control the result. The
Commissioner however urged that Hort should control because the consideration
received by the life beneficiaries was no more than an advance payment of future
income. Despite the fact that Blair did not involve a sale, and although Hort
did, it was held that Blair controlled; that an interest in property for assignment
of income purposes was likewise such an interest for capital gains purposes.
Hort, said the Court, involved merely "naked rights to receive income"'0 3 and
not an interest in property. An identical result obtained in McAllister v. Com-
missioner' 64 where the Court also rejected the Commissioner's position that there
had been no sale or exchange because the seller had "surrendered" her rights
rather than assigned them. Severely criticizing the distinction made between a
sale on one hand and termination, cancellation, or surrender on the other, the
Court held that a surrender to the remainderman had the same effect as a trans-
fer to third persons, stressing that in both situations the transaction is of an
"essentially dispositive nature." 1 5
Since the life tenant has been held to have sold a capital asset, the Court
decisions have allowed him a basis in the life interest. However, under these
decisions, the method of computing the basis is ambiguous.160 Strangely enough,
here it is the Commissioner who has come to the aid of the taxpayer by providing
in his Regulations that upon sale of a life estate there is allocated to it a portion
160. See generally, Lyon & Eustice, supra note 123, at 321-27; Plumb, Tax Efects
of Sales of Life Interests in Trusts, How To Eat Your Cake And Have It, 9 Tax L. Rev.
39 (1953).
161. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330
U.S. 826 (1947); Allen v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. in Macon, 157 F.2d 592 (5th Cir.
1946); Bell's Estate v. Commissioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943); Estate of Robert J.
Cuddihy, 32 T.C. 1171 (1959); Gladys Cheesman Evans, 30 T.C. 798 (1958), acq.,
1958-2 Cum. Bull. 5; Sayers F. Harman, 4 T.C. 335 (1944); Estate of Joseph N. Camden,
47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
162. 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943).
163. Id. at 458.
164. 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 330 U.S. 826 (1947).
165. Id. at 237.
166. See discussion in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 123, at 322-23.
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of the overall basis in the property assignable to the life interest under a table of
factors based upon actuarial principles. 167 The entire property has a "uniform
basis" with the life estate and remainder interest having sub-bases which con-
tinually shift in relation to each other, the basis in the life estate constantly
decreasing and that in the remainder constantly increasing. At the death of the
life tenant, the remainderman would have the whole of the uniform basis. Thus,
a life beneficiary of property having an overall basis of 100,000 dollars at 40
years of age could sell the life interest for 62,908 dollars' 68 and have no gain or
loss.
Moreover the remainderman will be entitled to amortize the cost of the
purchased life estate over the life expectancy of the life beneficiary. 69 Nor does
it appear, although there is absence of specific authority on the issue, that upon
the death of the life tenant, the remainderman's basis in the entire fee would
be reduced for the portion of the overall basis already used by the life tenant on
the sale.1 70 Since the remainderman is generally entitled to the full adjusted uni-
form basis at the life tenant's death, he should not be penalized for a use of part
of it by the life tenant on a sale of the life estate. Of course, this question should
not be affected by his ability to amortize the cost to him of the life estate since
he has a "cost" basis in that asset, which is separately acquired from the remain-
der interest.
It seems strange indeed that the lessor in gort who, under the analysis of
that case sells "future rentals" of real property, receives ordinary income, while
the life tenant of rental real property, whose rights consist essentially only of
the right to future rentals therefrom,17' sells "property" and receives capital
gain. And the life tenant's bounty is twice blessed: since gain is capital, appar-
ently it inexorably follows (even the Commissioner admits it in his Regulations)
that the life estate must be assigned part of the overall basis of the property.
This is so even though the life tenant is generally treated under the Code as
being simply in the income shoes of the remainderman, being unable to recover
any basis by amortization against the annual income payments172 and not being
given the exempt income benefits accorded to property received by gift, bequest,
devise or inheritance. 173
To make the comparison of the life estate cases with Hort more striking,
assume that the term of the leasehold in Hort was exactly the same as the life
expectancy of the life tenant in the life estate case, or even longer. Can any
rational argument be made that a sale of the future rentals in each case should
167. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5(a) (1957); Treas. Reg. § 1.1015-1(b) (1957).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5(a) (1957).
169. Bell v. Harrison, 212 F.2d 253 (7th Cir. 1954).
170. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-4(a) (1957). The ramifications of the problem are
discussed in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 123, at 323, n.126.
171. See text accompanying notes 54-56 supra.
172. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 273, disallows amortization of a life estate acquired by
gift, bequest or inheritance.
173. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 102(b).
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be treated differently? The stress of Blair, that the life tenant owns an equita-
ble interest in property, is hardly a reason for denying capital gain treatment to
a lessor who owns the entire fee-both a legal and equitable interest-in his
property. But apparently it can make a difference that the estates are separated,
with a life estate receiving favorable treatment even though it is sold by one
who continues to own the reversion. In Estate of Johnson N. Camden,174 the
taxpayer carved a life estate out of her fee and sold it to her husband. Rejecting
the Commissioner's theory that the life estate should be treated as a lease and
the consideration received by the taxpayer as prepaid rent, the Court found that
a life estate had been sold and that this was the sale of a capital asset. Hort
was distinguished on the ground that there was involved "merely ... the can-
cellation of a lease."'1 75 Of course, it is difficult to predict whether this case will
survive Lake because of the factor of carve-out.
The "property" approach of Blair is the obvious factor which leads to the
difference in result in the above example. The result is clearly unjust, if only be-
cause under the rationale of Hort the life estate cases should also have given rise
to ordinary income. The injustice is compounded when it is realized that each
of the cases, Hort and the life estate case, would be more justly decided if their
results were reversed: capital gain in Hort due to the value appreciation in the
lessee's promise to pay rent, and ordinary income in the life estate cases where
no value appreciation is being converted separate from that in the under-
lying fee. There is no reason to treat the sale of a life estate any differently than
a "sale" of a lease to a lessee for a lump sum. Unlike the situation in Hort where
the lease was terminated and the investment therein converted at a gain repre-
senting a value independent of the underlying real estate, the seller of a life
estate sells no commitment independent of and separate from the income-produc-
ing corpus.176
To make matters even more snarled, the selling life tenant is given a basis
for purposes of sale which basis can only be a part of the overall basis of the
property (except in the case where the life estate is purchased separately), while
in Hort, a basis for the lease was denied. 177
174. 47 B.T.A. 926 (1942), aff'd per curiam, 139 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1943).
175. Id. at 931.
176. If a lease favorable to the lessor is present, part of the gain would be due to
appreciation of the value of the lease, as in Hort.
177. 313 U.S. at 32. Hort is often accepted for the proposition that no separate basis
is assignable to the premium value of a favorable lease, i.e., the difference between the
rentals provided in the lease and the fair rental of the property at the time the property is
acquired by inheritance or by purchase. This interpretation is possible from the language of
the Court seeming to deny to the real estate and the lease separate values upon inheritance,
even though this was "theoretically" possible. Ibid. However, there appeared to be no
evidence that in 1928, at the time of the inheritance, the value of the real estate had been
enhanced by the lease and so no separate basis in the lease was acquired. Taxpayer seemed
to be trying to establish a loss by reference to the value of the lease at the time of the
cancellation, in 1933, and that value was irrelevant to any basis. In fact, the Tax Court
expressly found that the lease had no value in 1928. Walter M. Hort, 39 B.T.A. 922, 925,
926 (1939). This interpretation is confirmed by the Supreme Court citation of Appeal of
Farmer, 1 B.T.A. 711 (1925), 313 U.S. at 32, a case which denied a separate basis to a lease
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The combined effect of the rules governing the sale of life estates is star-
fling. Most striking is the possibility of complete avoidance of income tax during
the life of the selling life tenant. Take the example of a life beneficiary of a trust
holding securities worth 100,000 dollars at the time the estate is inherited. 78
More than six months later, at age forty, the beneficiary sells the life estate to
the remainderman for 62,908 dollars. Since this is the portion of the uniform basis
allocable to the life estate17 the life tenant has no gain or loss and the sales price
is received completely free of tax. Nor does the remainderman pay any tax as he
receives the yearly income, except to the extent that the annual income exceeds
his amortization deduction. In fact, if the remainderman does not wish to make
a lump sum purchase, he may agree to pay fixed annual payments to the bene-
ficiary for life. Then he may use the annual trust income to pay the purchase
price. This was the technique used in Gladys Cheesman Evans'80 where the
buyer of the life estate reported as income from the trust only the amount in
excess of his installment payment to the seller. The seller was held not to have
to pay tax on her receipts until her basis was recovered, and then any gain was
capital gain.' 8 '
In Evans, the Tax Court rejected the Commissioner's contention that there
was no sale, the Commissioner arguing that the taxpayer had merely exchanged
the life estate for an annuity paying amounts she could just as well have received
as a life tenant, so that there was no change effected in her economic position.
This argument smacks of an objection to the "boot strap financing" technique
whereby the purchase price of property is paid with future earnings from the
interest purchased. 8 2 The Tax Court distinguished Evans on this point in May
made after the property was acquired. Thus it appears that a basis for the lease was cor-
rectly denied in Hort and that the question of allocation of a separate basis for the purchase
or inherited premium value of a favorable lease was not decided. See Rubin, Depreciation
of Property Purchased Subject to a Lease, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1134, 1142, n.28 (1952);
Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 30-31.
The basis issue, of course, in no way affects the question of whether the receipt by the
lessor upon cancellation of a lease after rentals decline in the market is capital gain or
ordinary income. The fact that there is a zero basis in the lease in no way prevents it from
appreciating due to such a decline, and thus having a value separate from the real estate.
For cases concerning the question of assignment of a separate basis to a lease where
one owns both the real property leased and the lease itself, and the lease and property are
acquired when the lease has a "premium value" see Millinery Center Bldg. Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 350 U.S. 456 (1956); World Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 299 F.2d 614
(8th Cir. 1962) ; Schubert v. Commissioner, 286 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1961) ; Bernstein v. Com-
missioner, 230 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. Moore, 207 F.2d 265 (9th Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 942 (1954); Friend v. Commissioner, 119 F.2d 959 (7th Cir.
1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 673 (1941); Peters, 4 T.C. 1236 (1945). Cf. Cleveland
Allerton Hotel, Inc. v. Commissioner, 166 F.2d 805 (6th Cir. 1948); Young v. Commissioner,
59 F.2d 691 (9th Cir. 1932). See generally, Rubin, Depreciation of Property Purchased
Subject to a Lease, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1134 (1952).
178. The trust property would have a basis of $100,000 under Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§ 1014.
179. Treas. Reg. § 1.1014-5(a) (1957).
180. 30 T.C. 798 (1958) acq., 1958-2 Cum. Bull. 5.
181. See discussion of the Evans case in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 323-25.
182. See authorities in Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 325, n.132.
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T. Hrobon8s where taxpayer transferred to her husband a life estate in trust.
In consideration of the transfer, the husband agreed to pay her 60 percent of the
net annual distributions of the trust. Holding that the amounts received by the
seller were taxable as ordinary income, the Court found that there had been no
sale of the life estate but simply a transfer to her second husband by gift of the
right to receive 40 percent of the distributions of the trust, with the seller in effect
reserving 60 percent of those distributions to herself. Therefore, Bell's Estate and
McAllister, where the transfers were for a lump sum consideration, did not ap-
ply. Nor did Evans, where the transferor was to receive annual payments in fixed
amounts regardless of the income of the trust. In Hrobon, unlike those cases, the
compensation to be paid was dependent upon, or determined as a percentage of,
the trust income and therefore there was no sale of the interest. 8 4 The United
States Supreme Court recently passed on this point in Commissioner v. Brown. 8 5
There a charitable foundation purchased shares of stock of a corporation for 1.3
million dollars, the purchase price in effect to be paid out of 72 percent of the
operating profits of the business with no obligation on the part of the buyer to
make any payments except from the profits. The Commissioner argued that
there had been no substantial change in the economic position of the seller since
there had been no shift of business risk. The Court, reviewing the cases dealing
with retained economic interest, rejected this position, to make it clear that:
To require a sale for tax purposes to be to a financially responsible
buyer who undertakes to pay the purchase price from sources other than
the earnings of the assets sold or to make a substantial down payment
seems to us at odds with commercial practice and common understand-
ing of what constitutes a sale. 86
Of course, Hrobon can be distinguished from Brown since in Hrobon the life
estate was not sold for a fixed price and thus there was no ceiling on the buyer's
liability and no point at which the seller's interest in the asset sold would end.
Although the holding of the Tax Court in Hrobon seems to be that there
had been no sale of the life estate, there is some language in the opinion to the
effect that the whole area is subject to re-examination because of the decision
of the Supreme Court in Lake. The Court notes that the cases allowing capital
gains on such sales' 87 were decided prior to Lake. 8 8 Then, after holding there
had been no sale of the life estate, the Court continued that even if there had
been a "transfer," 1 9 the principles of Lake and Gillette Motor Transport Co.
require a holding against the taxpayer. However, further discussion indicates
183. 41 T.C. 476 (1964).
184. Id. at 497.
185. 380 U.S. 563 (1965).
186. Id. at 575. See generally, Zarky, supra note 69, at 399-402; Surrey, supra note 18,
at 1219-1220.
187. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946); Bell's Estate v. Com-
missioner, 137 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1943); Gladys Cheesman Evans, 30 T.C. 798 (1958).
188. 41 T.C. at 493.
189. Id. at 497.
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that these cases are being applied with regard to the "sale or exchange" require-
ment rather than that of "property."'190 Nevertheless, the language of Hrobon
shows discontent with the rule of Bell's Estate and McAllister. It may be the
first warning of a brewing storm that will eliminate the influence of Blair in this
area. Since one mistake often cancels out another, no one should be surprised
if the Hort-Lake future income rationale finally prevails.
Employment Contracts, Exclusive Agency, Distributorship and
Other Contract Rights
The commercial transactions involved in exclusive agency and management
contracts, distributorship agreements, "requirements" and "output" contracts,
exclusive licenses, and commitments made to supply goods or services are perhaps
the most productive source of litigation on the question of what is "property."
The contracts, involving a blend of physical property, personal services, good
will, and appreciation in value of commitments made, are not the traditional
form of asset accorded capital treatment. Also, since the contractual rights in-
volved are not freely marketable, dispositions are most generally by way of
termination or cancellation of rights, raising the issue of "sale or exchange."
One of the main ingredients in the complex asset generally termed an
"agency contract" is the factor of personal services. Therefore, before discussing
these contracts in general, discussion will focus first on the employment contract.
A. Contracts for the Performance of Personal Services
It is abundantly clear that Congress did not intend the preferential capital
gain treatment for compensation received in payment for the performance of
personal services. This conclusion follows both from the legislative history 91
and specific statutory provisions, although Congress has not been entirely con-
sistent in this area.192 Section 1221 denies capital gain treatment to a copyright,
literary, musical or artistic composition sold by the creator thereof. 93 Also
excluded from capital gain treatment are accounts or notes receivable acquired
in the ordinary course of business for services rendered. 94 Also, on the sale of
190. We think that applying the doctrine of the above two Supreme Court cases
to the transaction here involved requires us to hold that the income received by
May during the years here involved is taxable as ordinary income rather than capi-
tal gain. True, we find that there was a transfer of May's equitable interest in the
trust corpus but we can find no conversion of that interest for cash insofar as May
was concerned. All she was receiving after the transaction was a part of the same
income she was receiving prior to the transaction. . . .May was simply receiving a
lesser amount of the distribution from the trust than she had previously received
and there was no sale or exchange of that right.
Id. at 498.
191. See text accompanying notes 29, 30, supra.
192. Receiving the favored treatment are inventors, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1235,
and pension plan beneficiaries receiving termination distributions, Int. Rev. Code of 1954,
§§ 402(2), 403(a) (2). See also Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 421-25, relating to restrictive stock
options, preferred tax treatment thereof having been substantially tempered by the Revenue
Act of 1964.
193. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(3).
194. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1221(4).
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an interest in a partnership, the capital gain treatment generally allowed1e5 is
denied to receipts allocable to rights to payment for "services rendered, or to be
rendered."'1 6 There is a similar rule applicable on sales of stock of or distribu-
tions from collapsible corporations.1 7 Further evidence is the inclusion in "per-
sonal holding company income" of income from "personal service contracts."'0 8
Clearly then wages, salaries, and fees which are received in the normal
course or when sold as receivables by the earner thereof in return for a lump
sum payment are not entitled to capital gain treatment. 90 However, neither ,the
legislative history nor any section of the Internal Revenue Code seems to reach
a situation where an employee receives a payment in cancellation of, or upon the
sale of, an employment contract.20 0 The result in such situations is controlled
solely by decisions of the courts 2 01
As already indicated, where the question presented has been whether a
claim for compensation for services rendered in the past is entitled to capital
gain upon sale, the courts have uniformly held that the receipt is ordinary in-
come.202 The reasoning of the courts is well illustrated by Hubert M. Luna20 3
where taxpayer received a lump sum payment from an insurance company in
settlement of his right to receive renewal commissions upon insurance policies
issued prior to the termination of his employment with the company. Predicta-
bly, the court held the receipt was ordinary income relying on the Lake "future
ordinary income" rationale, 20 4 and also holding there had been no sale because
of the failure of the rights transferred to survive the settlement.2 5 Although
the court's reasoning can be criticized because it is founded upon the inept
future ordinary income rationale of Lake, and the much criticized doctrine
denying "sale or exchange" status to a cancellation, the result is proper. Amounts
received for personal services already rendered are within the congressional intent
195. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 741.
196. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 751(a), (c).
197. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341(b)(4).
198. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 543(a)(7).
199. See generally, Miller, Capital Gains Taxation of the Fruits of Personal Effort:
Before and Under the 1954 Code, 64 Yale L.J. 1, 16 (1954).
200. Ibid.
201. There will be no discussion of cases where the issue was one of fact; i.e., whether
the payment was compensation for personal services or the purchase price of a capital asset
the value of which is not easily ascertainable, such as a screenplay sold by a performer in
the film (Fred MacMurray, 21 T.C. 15 (1953)), stock of a corporation under contract to
produce a radio show starring the owner of the corporate stock (Jack Benny, 25 T.C. 197
(1955)), the partnership interests of partners who formed the partnership to produce a radio
show (Julius H. Groucho Marx, 29 T.C. 88 (1957)). The issue in these cases was whether
the amount was paid for the asset allegedly sold or for the services of the individual tax-
payer. See also cases in Miller, supra note 199, at 1 n.2, Mertens, Law of Federal Income
Taxation, § 22.32.
202. Jones v. Commissioner, 306 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1962); Hubert M. Luna, 42 T.C.
1067 (1964); Glen E. Alexander, 34 T.C. 758 (1960); Gerald B. O'Neill, 23 T.C.M. 7 (1964).
203. 42 T.C. 1067 (1964).
204. ". . . the taxpayer's rights--despite in their totalitarity they may be deemed
'property'--represent only the taxpayer's claim to amounts which would be ordinary income
to him as received. See Commissioner v. P. G. Lake, Inc ... !" Id. at 1079.
205. Id. at 1079.
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not to allow capital gains for the ordinary recurring receipts from the fruits of
property or labor, although received in a lump sum.206 Similar to the cases
decided under the "accrued income" theory where the gain is derived from past
earnings of property, in this situation the gain is attributable to past earnings
from personal services. There is no element of gain due to appreciation in value.
More difficult is the case of an employee who receives a lump sum payment
upon the cancellation of a contract to perform personal services, or sells the con-
tract to another, the consideration in no way representing payment for past
services. Here also, where the contract is only for the performance of personal
services as distinguished from exclusive agency or distributorship contracts
where generally some capital investment or goodwill is also present, the courts
have unanimously held against the taxpayer.207 In Thurlow E. McFall,20 8 McFall
contracted to work for five years as superintendent of Sparta Foundry Co. for
100 dollars per week and a percentage of profits. Two years later he sold his
contract rights to A. W. Clutter & Co. which had obtained a release of the
rights from Sparta. McFall received 175,000 dollars for his rights to perform
future services under the contract. The Board decided that the ieceipt was
ordinary income, relying on two main ideas. First, McFall had nothing he could
sell. The right to work in the future and be paid therefore could not be sold
before performance, and after performance the right was exhausted. Therefore,
reasoned the Board, there was nothing McFall could "own" for any period of
time. The right is "property" in the constitutional sense but it is not capital.
"Obviously it is not the sort of property which is susceptible of ownership for a
length of time as is a share of stock, a bond or a thing." 20 9 The second ground
of the decision appears to be that the statute "is not served by including within
it the contractual expectation of receiving pay for services not yet performed
.... ,,21o No congressional authority was cited as to the purpose of the statute.
Interestingly enough, the Board refused to decide the case upon the Com-
missioner's argument that McFall was receiving in advance the pay he would
have received had he continued to perform services under the contract and for
that reason the payment was ordinary income. After Lake, however, this argu-
ment of the Commissioner was not to be denied. In Holt v. Commissioner,211
taxpayer, a motion picture producer, entered into a contract with Paramount
Pictures whereby he was to produce a number of motion pictures in return for
a stated salary together with a share of gross receipts. After a few years, the
contract was cancelled because of a decline of public interest in the type of pic-
206. See text accompanying notes 29, 30, supra.
207. Holt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962); Victor H. Heyn, 39 T.C. 719(1963); David L. Gordon, 29 T.C. 510 (1957), aff'd, 262 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul.
58-301, 1958-1 Cum. Bull. 23; F. W. Jessop, 16 T.C. 491 (1951); Herman Shumlin, 16 T.C.
401 (1951); George K. Gann, 41 B.T.A. 388 (1940); Thurlow E. McFall, 34 B.T.A. log(1936); F. R. Ingram, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1447 (1961).
208. 34 B.T.A. 108 (1936).
209. Id. at 110.
210. Id. at 110-11.
211. 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
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ture being produced and taxpayer was paid a lump sum upon the cancellation.
Relying upon Lake, Horst and especially upon Hort, the Court found that tax-
payer had received merely a substitute for future ordinary income and was not
entitled to capital gains treatment. The payment to the taxpayer was treated as
if it had been received as compensation for his services as a producer.212 The
settlement appears to have been both for past services and for release of the
obligation to pay for future services. The Tax Court had found that the com-
pensation was for services "rendered or to be rendered,1 213 and Holt has been
so interpreted.214 But the Court made no distinction along these lines and the
entire payment to taxpayer was thought to be controlled by the Lake-Hort ra-
tionale.
McFall and Holt reveal three distinct grounds for denying "property"
status to a long-term contract to perform personal services. Under McFall, it
is an asset which is not capable of ownership; also it was not intended by Con-
gress to have preferred treatment. Under Holt, the payment in cancellation of
the contract is treated the same as income earned under the Hort-Lake "future
income" approach.
All three of these grounds are subject to criticism. In McFall, the taxpayer
did own something which was capable of ownership before services were per-
formed: a commitment of his employer in the form of a promise to pay money
on the providing of services. The Board states that this right of payment on the
performance of services is not the same as a stock, bond or thing. This statement
reflects more a habit of thought regarding the nature of capital assets than it
does a reasoned approach. The owner of a bond owns only the right to periodic
payments in return for supplying money. He owns a commitment in the form of
a promise that there will be paid to him a certain amount of money in the future.
McFall owned exactly the same kind of commitment, although the consideration
for it was his return promise to perform personal services instead of an invest-
ment of money. Such a promise is capable of ownership, and most important, is
capable of appreciation when the market rate of labor declines, the same as is
the promise in the bond when there is a decline in the general market rate of
interest. Therefore, capital gain for that appreciation upon its sale could not
be denied on the ground that McFall owned no property he could sell.
The "future income" doctrine applied in Holt, which treats amounts re-
ceived by the employee on cancellation of a contract to perform personal services
as payment for performance of those services, is subject to a like criticism. As
in Hort, where the lessor was not being paid for supplying the premises, in Holt
and in McFall a payment in cancellation of a contract to perform services in the
future is not a payment for services. Upon the cancellation the employee is no
longer required to perform services. As is clear from the facts in Holt where
212. Id. at 691.
213. Id. at 689; 35 T.C. at 597, 598.
214. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 1962).
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public interest declined in the type of picture taxpayer was to produce, the pay-
ment on cancellation is received on account of the appreciation to the employee
of the employer's long-term commitment to pay a stated amount for services,
which appreciation is due to a decline in value of the services to be performed.
The situation is again analogous to that of a bondholder when there is a decline
in the value of money with a corresponding drop in the market rate of interest.
The resulting gain on a sale of the bond is due to appreciation of the obligor's
commitment to pay a fixed interest, the appreciation being due to the general
decline in interest rates. Both situations involve the realization of appreciation
in value within the language of the Supreme Court in Gillette Motor Transport,
InC.215 The bondholder is not treated as if he had received "future income" over
the life of the bond; nor should the employee be treated as if he had been paid
for personal services performed over the life of the contract 2 16
The second ground relied upon in McFall, that "the purpose of the statute,
whether it be liberal or strict, is not served by including within it the contractual
expectation of receiving pay for services not yet performed,"217 is also open to
question. Neither the legislative history of section 1221 nor any provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code are pertinent to the situation in McFall since they
all indicate an intent that recurring receipts for personal services, whether re-
ceived in the normal course or in a lump sum after they have been earned, be
taxed as ordinary income. Thus, salary, rents, dividends and interest do not
receive capital gains treatment. However, as already seen, the gain in McFall
was not for the performance of personal services but due to the appreciation in
value of a commitment to pay a stated amount for services. Once this fact is
recognized, it seems clear that in -the McFall situation both the employer and the
employee made an "investment"; each bound himself to an exchange of money
and services at a stated price for a substantial period of time. Thus, each of the
parties assumed a market risk: the employee that the price of his labor would
remain stable or increase; -the employer that this price would remain stable or
decrease. A change in the value of the employee's labor will cause each of them
to sustain a profit or loss upon the cancellation or sale of the contract. Since it
was the intent of Congress to provide inducement for "risk-taking," it is not
at all clear that a long-term personal services contract is not within that intent.
Not only is there present "risk-taking" but the commitment by McFall of
his personal services on a long-term basis at a fixed compensation would seem
as valuable an "investment" as a commitment of money capital. In certain situa-
215. 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
216. The transaction is characterized by Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 29, "as involving
a sale of an opportunity to profit rather than a compensated service . . ." which presents
"... an instance of accrued value appreciation .. . a broad test of ... [which] would be
whether the taxpayer possesses an interest which can be disposed of for a consideration with-
out the further commitment of his own resources, that is, without obligation on the tax-
payer's part to perform a further service or to furnish anything additional in the way of
labor or capital.... The source of value ... is in the contract commitment itself and in the
willingness of the parties to take the risks of the market for the period agreed upon."
217. 34 B.T.A. at 110-11.
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tions, and McFall and Holt seem typical of them, an employer will not commit
himself to a business or venture unless he is assured of the availability of certain
skills or services for a long term. Therefore, as much as money capital, a long-
term employment contract will contribute to what "investment" and "capital
mobility" are dedicated: the creation of new jobs and economic growth.218
On the other hand, in Holt it was suggested that a capital transaction re-
quire a capital investment and that the taxpayer was not entitled to capital
gains since he had invested nothing except his services as a producer.21 Holt
is not strong authority for such a position since the Court relied mainly on the
future ordinary income rationale and further, the payment received was at least
in some part and perhaps in large part, considered to be for past personal services.
However, in Ralph Bellamy 220 the Tax Court placed strong reliance on this
factor. Taxpayer, a prominent actor, had made a series of television films under
a contract which prevented the films from being re-run on the expiration of
a specified time after the expiration of the contract. The right not to have the
films re-run after this time was important to Bellamy in order to prevent the
films from competing with his current acting commitments and also because
they might prove detrimental to his professional career by "typing" him with
the detective he played in the films, a "Mike Barnett." Eight years later, while
Bellamy was acting in a Broadway play, and feeling it would be helpful to have
some television exposure during this time, in return for a lump sum payment of
89,000 dollars he released his right to prevent the re-runs so that the films could
again be shown. Relying heavily upon the language in Gillette Motor Transport22'
to the effect that the right to use one's property is not something in which there is
any investment separate and apart from the physical property itself and that no
basis could be allocated to such right to use, the Tax Court held that Bellamy
had no investment in the right to prevent re-runs. Hence, reasoned the Court,
that right had no basis in his hands, and therefore it was not a capital asset.
Such an analysis seems improper. First, Gillette Motor Transport is misapplied.
There the Supreme Court was dealing with a receipt in the nature of rent where
only the use of the property and not the physical asset itself had been sold. The
language of the Court relied upon in Bellamy 222 was used by the Court to ac-
centuate the fact that the right to use of physical property is not the property
in which there is the investment. Its language regarding basis is not necessary
to this proposition and seems to do no more than point up the fact that the right
218. In this context, the point is often made that labor needs no incentive since the
working man has no alternative but to work. He cannot keep his labor off the market with-
out losing his income entirely, whereas the holder of a stock or bond has the alternative of
enjoying a recurrent yield instead of transferring the asset. Comment, supra note 27, at 742.
But see Miller, supra note 25, at 1076. This argument certainly has validity as regards the
ordinary salary of the working man. However, it fails to reach the McFall situation since
there the contract was an alternative that could be induced. McFall could have stayed on
the normal market instead of tying up his services for five years.
219. 303 F.2d 687, 691 (9th Cir. 1962).
220. 43 T.C. 487 (1965).
221. 364 U.S. 130 (1960).
222. 364 U.S. at 135.
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to use ordinarily can have no basis separate from the basis of the physical prop-
erty.223 To construe the Court's statement to mean that property which has a
zero basis due to lack of capital investment cannot be a capital asset is unwar-
ranted. There is no better example of a person who has solely a right to use in
which he has a zero basis due to lack of investment than a lessee. A literal ap-
plication of the holding in Bellamy would turn into ordinary income the gain of
a lessee on the cancellation of a lease he has not purchased.224
In section 1241 of the Code, Congress has also hinted at a requirement of
substantial capital investment where it guarantees "sale or exchange" treatment
for cancellation of leases or "a distributor's agreement (if the distributor has
a substantial capital investment in the distributorship)." The Senate Finance
Committee Report expressly states that this section is not intended to deal with
the requirement of the presence of a "capital asset. '225 If this is so, it is difficult
to see why the statute contains the parenthetical clause requiring a "substantial
capital investment" in a distributorship before sale or exchange consequences will
follow. In withholding sale or exchange treatment for cancellations of distributor-
ships where there is no such investment, the Congress seems to be making a
decision that such distributorships are not capital assets. However, this inference
is contradicted by the fact that no such requirement of investment is imposed
for a lessee to have the benefit of the section, even though a lessee will have no
investment in the lease. Nor did Bellamy rely on this section for its conclusion
regarding the need for investment. Apparently the Committee Report's express
denial of an intent to define "capital asset" is to be taken at face value.
It would therefore appear that the opinion of the Tax Court in Bellamy
regarding the necessity of investment cannot be read broadly, but must be read
in connection with the personal services required by Bellamy under the contract.
Thus viewed, it is seen that Bellamy's right to prevent re-runs was received in
consideration of his performance of personal services under the contract. The
amount received on sale of those rights therefore represented payment for past
personal services and must be taxed as ordinary income. Unlike McFall where
the amount paid to the taxpayer on the sale of a personal service contract was
223. Of course, if the property is purchased or inherited in such form as a lease with((premium value" then it is possible to have a separate basis therein. See note 178, supra.
224. In A.L.I. Draft, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains Taxation (1960) the
position is taken that in order for property to be a capital asset it must represent a sub-
stantial capital investment. "If the inherent nature of the asset is such that its acquisition
does not characteristically involve an outlay of funds or commitment of credit, the according
of capital gain treatment on its subsequent disposition cannot be justified on the ground of
encouraging risk taking. The .. .Draft . .. therefore provides as a requirement of capital
asset classification that the asset be of a class which characteristically requires either an
outlay of funds or commitment of credit at the time of its acquisition." Pp. 10, 11. This
position fails to take into account that other commitments besides those of capital or credit
involve risk taking. Thus, for example, the long term commitment of one's labor, as in
McFall, involves the taking of a risk as to the market price of labor.
225. Sen. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954) p. 445, states: "Further, applica-
tion of the section determines only whether an exchange of the proceeds for the lease or
agreement has taken place, but not whether such proceeds are gain from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset or note; the latter is to be determined by other applicable provisions of
law rather than by this section."
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not for past services but for release from a promise to pay for future services
due to a change in the market value of the employer's commitment, in Bellamy
the receipt represented part of taxpayer's past earnings in the nature of a liquida-
tion of a claim for services already performed, analogous to an account or note
receivable for personal services.226 Thus viewed, Bellamy's right, although "prop-
erty" within the meaning of section 1221 if acquired by way of purchase, is not
such "property" when received as compensation for past services.227 This inter-
pretation of Bellamy is reinforced by the Tax Court's rejection of Commissioner
v. Ferrer228 as controlling authority. There, taxpayer was held entitled to capital
gains on the sale of a power to prevent disposition of certain motion picture
rights which power was acquired incident to a "lease" of the right to produce
a play. Distinguishing Ferrer, the Tax Court correctly noted that in that case
the right was not acquired in consideration of the performance of personal serv-
ices.
On the other hand the long-term employment contract seems to fall outside
the Congressional purpose to reduce the deterrent effect of the ordinary income
tax on the sales of capital investments, the so-called "lock-in," and thus encour-
age their sale.229 This theory at least partially justifies the lower rate of tax as
necessary to prevent the hindrance of sales of appreciated property and conse-
quent re-investment. Arguably, in the case of personal service contracts there is
no real "lock-in" because, unlike a share of stock or a piece of rental real estate
where tax on the appreciation can be avoided merely by holding the property
until death, the value appreciation in a personal service contract may not be
deferred indefinitely since the appreciation must be realized over the period of
226. Herman Shumlin, 16 T.C. 407 (1951), where the producer of a successful play
was entitled to share in the proceeds of any sale of motion picture rights as part of com-
pensation for his services. A lump sum payment in release of these rights was held to be
ordinary income, the Tax Court comparing the release with a discount of a note received in
consideration of personal services. See also Helvering v. Smith, 90 F.2d 590, 592 (2d Cir.
1937).
227. Of course, if it had been possible to tax Bellamy on the value of his right at the
time it was acquired, he would then have acquired it by "purchase" and any increase in its
value would have given him capital gain. Silverstein, supra note 21, at 1289. Cf. Gilbert v.
Commissioner, 56 F.2d 361 (1st Cir. 1932), decided when the predecessor of section 1221(1)
excluded from the capital asset category "property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale in
the course of his trade or business." The section now reads "property held . . . primarily for
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business." See also Rev. Rul. 58-402,
1958-2 Cui. Bull. 15 regarding the valuation of contracts and claims to receive indefinite
amounts.
Rights comparable to those held by Bellamy have been held to be capital assets where
not acquired for personal services. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962)
(limited right to prevent disposition of motion picture rights to a play); Commissioner v.
Ray, 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829 (1954) (right of a lessee not to
have the lessor enter into leases with competitors of the lessee); Commissioner v. Starr
Bros. Inc., 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953) (exclusive right to sell a manufacturer's products in
a limited area); Hollywood Baseball Ass'n, 42 T.C. 234 (1964) (exclusive rights under
the rules of monopoly baseball to prevent major league teams from playing baseball in
their locations). In all of these cases, the taxpayer had a right which prevented competition
with some interest or property of his, thus protecting his ability to earn income from that
property. Bellamy had just such a right.
228. 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
229. See generally Miller, supra note 25, at 1074-78; A.L.I. Draft, supra note 224,
at 8-12.
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the remaining life of the contract through the payments of salary. However, this
is true of all assets which will yield income for a limited period such as a life
estate, a lease, or fixed term obligations. The holder of such assets does not have
the power to defer indefinitely -the tax on an appreciation in value as does the
holder of an asset which has an unlimited life.230 Thus, if the owner of a stated
interest bond does not take his appreciation by way of a sale, he will eventually
be taxed at ordinary income rates as he receives the periodic interest payments
over the life of the bond. The bond, therefore, presents no more of a "lock-in"
problem than does the personal service contract and there is no reason for dis-
tinguishing between the two on this ground.
In summary, where a contract is solely for the rendering of personal serv-
ices, the courts will deny capital asset status on the ground that the contract is
not "property" capable of ownership, or that Congress never intended capital
treatment for such contracts, or on the future income rationale. The intent of
Congress regarding such contracts is somewhat ambiguous, but it is not so clear
as not to warrant discussion and analysis and to be merely assumed as contrary
to the taxpayer. The "property" and "future income" doctrines do not bear
analysis and indeed are used as a substitute for analysis. The area is in critical
need of re-evaluation by the courts in the light of notions of commitment to risk
and value appreciation. However, hostility to such contracts seems so basic,
there seems little hope for reconsideration at the judicial level. Recall the
length to which the Court of Claims went to deny capital gain on the sale of
a purchased right to a contingent legal fee in Wilkinson v. United States28 '
where the taxpayer's personal services were involved. There, the Court seemed
to hold as an alternative ground that the amount received on sale of the
fee was compensation for taxpayer's personal legal services rendered in the
case. However, although taxpayer acquired part of his rights to the fee in
return for acting as attorney in the case, the portion of the fee that he sold was
acquired by purchase and not for his services. Had he not made the purchase
he would have had no right to that portion of the fee. 23 2 But because of the
presence in the situation of his personal services, the Court denied capital gain
treatment on what seems clearly to be an investment return.
However, labels are important in this area. If one can avoid selling the right
to past or future income from "personal services" and sell instead "good will,"
the courts have little difficulty in finding capital gain.28 8 In George J. Aitkin,3 4
for example, taxpayer, employed as a solicitor by a casualty insurance agency,
sold to the agency "insurance expirations" for 10,000 dollars. The expirations con-
230. See A.L.I. Draft, supra note 224 at 8.
231. See text accompanying notes 129-36, supra.
232. This was the position taken in the dissenting opinion of justice Whittaker, 157
Ct. C. at 868, 304 F.2d at 480 (1962).
233. Commissioner v. Killian, 314 F.2d 852 (5th Cir. 1963); Nelson Weaver Realty Co.
v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962); Calley v. United States, 220 F. Supp. 111(S.D. W. Va., 1963); Edward A. Kenney, 37 T.C. 1161 (1962); George J. Aitkin, 35 T.C.
227 (1960).
234. 35 T.C. 227 (1960).
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sisted of taxpayer's files regarding policies issued which contained such informa-
tion as expiration dates and premiums. The "expirations" were held to be capital
assets in the nature of good will since they had a potential to produce future
business as customer lists. This rule is, of course, recognized by both the Com-
missioner and the courts. 235 However, upon analysis, it is a difficult one to under-
stand. In Aitkin, the value of the customer lists which comprised the good will
sold was entirely attributable to the former personal services of the taxpayer.
Thus, the value of the good will was no more than the value of taxpayer's past
personal services which was reflected in the customer lists. Any amount ultimately
received for that value arguably could be treated as earnings from personal
services. It seems difficult to distinguish between such good will and amounts
received for a covenant not to compete which are taxed as ordinary income.2 0
Both represent the value of income that would otherwise be received in the
future by the seller and which is already "earned" by past services.23 7 Neverthe-
less, the courts give capital gain for the sale of goodwill, while denying it for
sales of a right to perform services.
B. Exclusive Agency, Distributorship and Other Contract Rights
As distinguished from the contract only to perform personal services, the
exclusive agency and other contracts discussed under this heading, while they
involve personal services, also have associated with them other elements such
as goodwill, physical property, and capital investment. Also, there is generally
lacking a strict employee-employer relationship and the taxpayer can be viewed
as owning a "business." Although the courts have had more difficulty in finding
a place for these contracts in the capital asset definitional structure, with only a
few exceptions capital asset treatment has been largely denied under one or more
of three standard approaches. 238
Under one theory, where there has been a cancellation or termination of
the contract between the parties thereto, as distinguished from a transfer to a
third person, the courts hold there is no "sale or exchange." The Commissioner
has also succeeded on a second theory that the contract rights involved are not
"property" and therefore are not capital assets. Thirdly, especially since Lake,
the courts are prone to find that the payments received are essentially a substi-
tute for future ordinary income.
1. The Sale or Exchange Cases
In Commissioner v. Starr Bros., Inc.239 taxpayer received a lump sum set-
tlement on the cancellation of a contract with a drug manufacturer under which
235. See cases cited note 233 supra; Rev. Rul. 57-480, 1957-2 Cum. Bull. 47; Mertens,
Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 22.50 (1955).
236. See generally Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation, § 22.33 (1955).
237. See Pines, Federal Income Taxation of Intangible Assets, 8 Tax. L. Rev. 231-37
(1953).
238. See generally Lyon & Eustice, supra note 50, at 346-353.
239. 204 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1953).
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taxpayer had the exclusive agency to sell the manufacturer's products in a limited
area. The receipt was held to be ordinary income. Assuming arguendo that the
contract was a capital asset, the court held there was no sale or exchange since
the taxpayer had merely released the manufacturer from its contractual obliga-
tion not to sell to other dealers in the area involved. This merely ended the
manufacturer's duties toward the taxpayer and destroyed the taxpayer's rights;
they were not transferred to the company. The transaction was analogized to
amounts received on a note when it is surrendered for payment. 240 In another
case involving an exclusive agency contract, General Artists Corp. v. Commis-
sioner,241 taxpayer was the exclusive booking agent for singer Frank Sinatra
under a contract whereby it was to receive ten percent of his earnings from
bookings. Taxpayer "sold" the contract to another agency, MCA Artists, Ltd.,
under an agreement that after the assignment the contract would be cancelled
so that MCA would enter into a new contract with Sinatra. The amount re-
ceived upon the "sale" was held to be ordinary income on the authority of Starr
Bros., Inc. even though the transaction was cast in the form of a sale rather than
a termination or cancellation. The Court viewed the transaction as in effect a
cancellation by taxpayer of its contract with Sinatra in order to allow MCA to
enter into original dealings with him. A similar result obtained in Paul Small
Artists, Ltd., Inc.242 where taxpayer, a booking agency, sold a contract with an
actor to another agency for 25,000 dollars. Although there was no cancellation
of the contract between the artist and the new agency, General Artists was held
controlling and the receipt was ordinary income. Viewing the transaction simply
as a termination of the relationship previously existing between the taxpayer and
the artist and the creation of a similar but new relationship between the buying
agent and the artist, the Tax Court found that in substance there was merely a
substitution of one agent for another. "We do not think," said the Court, "that
the form of the transaction, i.e., whether the old contracts were to be cancelled
and new ones entered into, or whether the new agent simply stepped into the
shoes of the old with the artist's consent, should lead to a result here different
from that reached in General Artists. '243 A vigorous dissent pointed out that,
unlike General Artists, the contract rights did not vanish, but were transferred
and continued to survive in the hands of the buying agency.
Similar results have been reached in cases involving contracts giving the
exclusive right to purchase all of another's production output. In Commissioner
v. The Pittston Co.2 44 ordinary income was held to flow from the cancellation
of a contract under which the taxpayer had the exclusive right for a period of
years to purchase all the coal mined by the operator of mining property. There
was a termination and extinguishment of taxpayer's rights and therefore no sale
240. Id. at 674.
241. 205 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 866 (1953).
242. 37 T.C. 223 (1961).
243. Id. at 227.
244. 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
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or exchange. Specifically rejected was the Tax Court's position that the extin-
guishment of a contract duty to deal only with one person transfers to the trans-
feree a right to deal with all the world. Also distinguished were the sale of life
estate and cancellation of leases cases as relating to matters of "greater sub-
stance" than mere "contract rights."245 The result was the same in Marc D.
Leh24G where taxpayer had entered into a long-term contract giving him the
right to purchase from a corporation two and one-quarter million gallons of
gasoline a month. Two years later, when gasoline was in short supply, taxpayer
agreed to cancel and terminate the contract in consideration of 183 million
dollars. Agreeing with the taxpayer that the contract was property used in the
trade or business which, on sale, would give capital gain2 47 the Court held there
was no sale or exchange of the contract since all the taxpayer gave was a re-
lease from the obligation to sell gasoline. The only rights the taxpayer had were
rights to buy gasoline and these rights were not "transferred"; they merely came
to an end and vanished. Again the cancellation of lease cases were distinguished
on the ground that a lease is a more substantial property right which does not
lose its existence when transferred. 248
However, a "sale" was found in Commissioner v. Goff24 where taxpayers
had provided machines to a manufacturing company under an agreement whereby
the manufacturing company promised to pay for their use and to sell the produce
of the machines to taxpayers alone. On a "sale" by taxpayers of their rights
under the agreement to the manufacturing company, it was held that taxpayers
were entitled to capital gain. "We do not see," stated the Court, "in principle
how the person to whom a tangible right is transferred can affect the ques-
tion whether the transfer is a sale or exchange. ' 250 The Court then went on to
narrow its holding by relying upon the cancellation of lease doctrine, and dis-
tinguishing Starr Bros. and General Artists, to the effect that the lease cases
involved more substantial rights and that the case at bar was within the can-
cellation of lease cases. The right that the taxpayer had to the exclusive product
of machines "was a substantial right and, if it is important, it was a right con-
nected with the use of specific tangible property, that is, the machines them-
selves.1 251
Although Goff shows dissatisfaction with the "sale or exchange" issue as a
determining factor on the capital gains question, to a large extent it accords
with the approach of most cases in making the determining factor for capital
gains taxation whether the asset disposed of survives the transaction. This
approach, however, seems to be merely a blind which is being used in an attempt
to avoid the problem of deciding the basic issue of "property." The real inquiry
245. Id. at 347.
246. 27 T.C. 892 (1957), aff'd, Leh v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 489 (9th Cir. 1958).
247. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231.
248. 27 T.C. at 898, 260 F.2d at 493.
249. 212 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 829.
250. Id. at 876.
251. Id. at 876-77.
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is nevertheless directed toward the nature of the asset-whether it is one that
survives or does not survive the transaction-and the courts are really deciding
the "property" issue under the "sale or exchange" rubric. Because the technical
requirements of a "sale or exchange" are more easily applied than the vague and
difficult standard of "property," the courts understandably tend to decide the
cases on that issue. In fact, in Paul Small Artists, Ltd., Inc.25 2 the Tax Court
went to the extent of using this test to deny capital gains treatment where there
was an actual sale or exchange, pursuing an analysis that the "net effect" of the
transaction was the same as the cancellation of the old agency agreement and
the substitution of an identical new one with the transferee of the contract.
However, as noted, the courts have to constantly distinguish the cases al-
lowing as a "sale or exchange" the cancellation of a lease favorable to the lessee
on the ground, following the Blair approach, that a lease is more "substantial
property." In Commissioner v. Ferrer,53 taking a- new tack, the Second Circuit
relied on these cases to reject the distinction between a sale to a third person
whereby the asset transferred continues to exist, and a release that results in
its extinguishment. The facts in Ferrer are somewhat complicated. Briefly
stated, in 1951 actor Jose Ferrer contracted with Pierre LaMure for Ferrer to
produce a stage play based upon LaMure's novel "Moulin Rouge," a biography
of Henri de Toulouse-Lautrec. Under the contract Ferrer acquired a "lease" of
the right to produce the play, a power to prevent any disposition of the motion
picture rights until the play had run for a period of time, and the right to re-
ceive forty percent of the motion picture proceeds if the play was in fact pro-
duced. In 1952, Ferrer agreed to cancel the contract with LaMure and to give up
his rights in the play and movie receipts in consideration of a contract with John
Huston's production company, whereby Ferrer would play the part of Toulouse-
Lautrec in a movie and be paid a salary and a percentage of the net motion pic-
ture profits. In determining whether the amount received under the percentage
arrangement was capital gain, the Court held there was a sale or exchange,
rejecting the distinction between a sale to a third person whereby the asset
transferred continues to exist, and a release that results in its extinguishment.
The Court took Internal Revenue Code Section 1241 as "indicating Congres-
sional disenchantment with this formalistic distinction."2 54 Tax law, noted the
Court, is concerned with substance and not form. It made no difference to the
parties whether Ferrer sold his rights to Huston's company, Moulin, which would
then release them to LaMure, or released them directly to LaMure for a con-
sideration paid by Moulin. Both are "sales" and the nature of Ferrer's gain was
determined by attacking the problem of whether he had sold a "capital asset."
Also rejecting a technical approach to "sale or exchange" is United States
v. Dresser Industries, Inc.2 55 where taxpayer released an exclusive license to
252. 37 T.C. 223 (1961).
253. 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
254. Id. at 131.
255. 324 F.2d 56 (Sth Cir. 1963).
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practice a patented process in return for a percentage of the fees earned thereby.
Criticizing the Commissioner's argument that there had been no sale but merely
a "termination or relinquishment," and relying strongly on Commissioner v.
Ray,256 the Court found no difference between a transaction with a third party
and one with the owner of the patent. As long as the transferor disposes of and
the transferee obtains a valuable right, it does not matter that the right which is
relinquished vanishes. "It is plain," said the Court, "that before the transaction,
taxpayer had a right in property; after the transaction was consummated, it
no longer had this right, but a claim to money. 257 Therefore, there was a sale
or exchange. 25 8
The approach of the Courts in Ferrer and Dresser Industries, Inc. not only
makes good sense, but as noted in Ferrer, is in accord with the intent of Con-
gress that the sale or exchange requirement not be applied in a technical formal-
istic manner. Ferrer noted Congressional "disenchantment" with the technicali-
ties of the "sale or exchange" requirement, pointing to the enactment of section
1241 which presumes a "sale or exchange" upon certain cancellations of leases
and distributors agreements. And, of course, there has been further long-stand-
ing evidence of such disenchantment. 259 Happily, the influence of Hort and Blair
on the "sale or exchange" issue appears to be waning.
2. The Future Income Rationale
Prior to the decision in Lake, it had been held that a sale or cancellation of
an exclusive agency contract was the sale of a capital asset. 200 In Elliot B.
Smoak261 taxpayer had an exclusive agency for leasing and licensing machines
used in distributing milk and other dairy products and paper containers, under
a royalty arrangement. A sale of his rights under the agency contract was held
to be a sale of a capital asset--"a going agency business." 2 2 The case was held
not to fall within McFall since taxpayer had sold more than the right to earn
money by performance of services; he had also sold his office files, records, and
the good will of the business which he had built up over the course of two years.
Since good will is a capital asset the portion of the purchase price allocable
thereto would clearly have been capital gain. However, the value of the right to
earn future royalties under the agency contract was not so clearly a capital asset.
By dealing with the transaction as if there had been a sale of a "business" the
256. 210 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1954), discussed in text accompanying notes 95-96, supra.
257. 324 F.2d at 59.
258. Accord: Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson, 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963).
259. Congress has attempted to make certain that capital gain or loss will or will not be
the tax result in certain situations. See, e.g., Int. Rev. Code of 1954 § 331(a) (corporate
liquidations) ; § 302 (redemption of stock) ; § 1232 (satisfaction of certain corporate obliga-
tions) ; § 741 (transfer of a partnership interest) ; § 166(d) (nonbusiness bad debts) ; § 165(g)
(worthless securities) ; § 1231 (certain involuntary conversions).
260. Jones v. Corbyn, 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950); Elliot B. Smoak, 43 B.T.A. 907(1941) ; Rev. Rul. 55-374, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 370.
261. 43 B.T.A. 907 (1941).
262. Id. at 910.
CAPITAL GAINS
Court sidestepped the problem involved in comminuting the business into its
fragments and dealing with each of them separately.263 A similar approach was
taken in Jones v. Corbyn26 4 where taxpayer had for ten years been the exclusive
agent of a life insurance company under a contract giving him the right exclu-
sively to solicit life insurance policies in Oklahoma. The contract was cancelled
by the parties for a lump sum, taxpayer also transferring all of his books, records
and files. No transfer was made of commissions earned or of renewal commis-
sions. Rejecting the argument of the Commissioner that taxpayer had sold noth-
ing more than an employment contract to perform personal services the amount
received upon cancellation was held to be capital gain. The contract was said to
have substantial value and to be capable of producing income. Furthermore,
said the Court, the business built up through the efforts of taxpayers over the
years, netting approximately 30,000 dollars per year to the agency was a valu-
able asset which had been transferred. The Court thus pointed to two separate
elements which had been sold: the agency contract, which in itself had value,
and the value of the "business." The second element perhaps represented the
value of the good will inherent in the customer leads which would be provided
by the office files and records. However, the Court failed to deal separately with
the assets sold and therefore the appreciated value of the contract right to
represent the insurance company as an exclusive agent was given capital gain
treatment. This caused a dissent on the ground that the only transfer was of
the right to act as agents of the insurance company which was merely a right to
render future personal services and to earn compensation therefor. Such commis-
sions, argued the dissent, would have been ordinary income when earned and so
a lump sum paid for the surrender of the right to render such services must also
constitute ordinary income. The dissent, of course, is right on the point that part
of what taxpayer transferred was the right to perform personal services. Had the
Court comminuted the business into its fragments under the rule of Williams v.
McGowan- 5 it would have been required to deal with the position taken in
McFall that the sale of the right to render future personal services is not a
capital asset. However, this issue is apparently clouded by the bundle of rights
which is sold as a "business." Even the Commissioner has held that a sale of an
exclusive distributorship with a foreign manufacturer, where no physical assets
or fixtures are conveyed, is a capital asset because such a contract is not ex-
cluded from the capital asset definition of section 1221.266
Since the Supreme Court has decided Lake, the courts have separated
the elements involved in the sale of a business and come to grips with the issue
of the sale of a right to earn future personal services income. Ignoring Jones v.
Corbyn the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Eidson, Jr.2 67 held that ordinary
263. See Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
264. 186 F.2d 450 (10th Cir. 1950).
265. 152 F.2d 570 (2d Cir. 1945).
266. Rev. Rul. 55-374, 1955-1 Cum. Bull. 370.
267. 310 F.2d 111 (5th Cir. 1962); accord, Hyatt v. Commissioner, 325 F.2d 715
(5th Cir. 1963).
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income was realized upon a sale of a general agency contract with a mutual
insurance company having six years to run. Square reliance was placed upon
Lake. No capital asset was sold since the amount received on the sale represented
the present cash value of what otherwise would have been compensation for
personal services over the balance of the life of the contract.208 A prior decision
of the same Court2 9 was distinguished on the ground that it involved a sale
of good will. The holding in Eidson accords with the position of the Ninth
Circuit in Holt v. Commissioner70 in treating the payment received on the sale
of the contract as if it were received as compensation for services performed.
Although taxpayers argued that they were not required to perform services after
the sale, thus pointing up the fact that the receipt was not for services performed
or to be performed, this fact was held not to affect the nature of the payment,
but only its amount.271 The Court refused to recognize the appreciation in
value of the commitment to pay a stated compensation for personal services
and that the receipt reflected that appreciation. The Fifth Circuit reaffirmed the
position taken in Eidson in United States v. Woolsey2 72 which involved a sale
of interests in a partnership which owned a nineteen year exclusive management
contract with a mutual insurance company. On the authority of Lake, the pro-
ceeds from the sale allocable to the contract were held to result in ordinary in-
come. The extent to which the future ordinary income rationale can be carried is
illustrated by the statement of the Court that:
It is always pertinent to inquire how the proceeds to be received would
have been taxable if there had been no assignment of the contract.
Close scrutiny is required if the consideration received is actually a
present substitute for what would have been ordinary earned income in
the hands of the assigning taxpayer, if the assignment or transfer bad
not been made.273
Looking at the underlying right assigned, the Court concluded that the amount
received on the sale which was allocable to the value of the contract was ordinary
income since it related to the right to earn ordinary income in the future for
personal services.2 7 4 Besides its general reliance on Lake, the Court found that
section 751,275 which treats as ordinary income amounts received on sale of a
partnership interest attributable to "unrealized receivables," precluded capital
gain treatment. Section 751 defines an "unrealized receivable" as a right to
268. 310 F.2d at 117.
269. Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 285-290, infra.
270. 303 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1962).
271. "That is," stated the Court, "the fact that the taxpayers would have to spend
their time and energies in performing services for which the compensation would be received
merely affects the price at which they would be willing to assign or transfer the contract,"
310 F.2d at 115.
272. 326 F.2d 287 (5th Cir. 1963).
273. Id. at 291.
274. Ibid.
275. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 751.
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payment for "services rendered, or to be rendered."2 76 Holding that the amount
received for the contract was for "services ... to be rendered," the Court treated
the sale proceeds as if for actual performance by the taxpayers of the contract,
ignoring the fact that no future services were to be rendered. The payment was
not for any services but for appreciation in the value of the contract. However,
capital gain was given to amounts received for the sale of the taxpayers state-
wide charter, operating records and good will, the Court requiring that the con-
sideration be comminuted into its fragments and allocated among the various
assets sold.277 In Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. v. Tomlinson,278 the Fifth Circuit again
held against a taxpayer who had terminated an agency relationship by selling
certain mortgage servicing contracts under which taxpayer earned a fee for
personal services in servicing the loans. The termination fee was ordinary in-
come under Hort and Lake principles to the extent that it represented the right
to earn future ordinary income. A conflict with a prior decision in the same
circuit 27 9 was noted, and the distinction there made, that what was received
bore no relation to the amount of future income that could be earned, was
rejected on the basis of Eidson, and the rationale of Lake was held controlling.
As to the portion of the purchase price allocable to taxpayer's files and records,
which possessed independent value as customers lists, the Court held there had
been received capital gain. Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. was followed by the Fifth
Circuit in General Guaranty Mortgage Co. v. Tomlinsone8 0 where a mortgage
servicing contract with taxpayer was terminated because the bank whose mort-
gages were being serviced determined it could do the servicing for one-half the
amount being paid the taxpayer. That amount was held to have been received
as a substitute for future servicing commissions and again allocation was required
between ordinary income amounts and those allocable to the purchase of good
will items.
In a case involving an exclusive license to use and to sub-license the use of
a patented process where, being unable to keep up with the demand for the pro-
cess, taxpayer relinquished its exclusive license in return for a non-exclusive
license and a percentage of royalty payments to be received by the licensor
from other licensees, the Tenth Circuit in Wiseman v. Halliburton Oil Well
Cementing Co.281 held the proceeds of the sale of the license were ordinary
income, rejecting its decision in Jones v. Corbyn and relying on the traditional
Hort-Lake future income rationale. The Court also stressed the absence of
capital investment.28 2
In the wake of the above decisions by the courts of appeals, the Tax Court
276. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 751(c) (2).
277. 326 F.2d at 292.
278. 320 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1963).
279. Nelson Weaver Realty Co. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962), dis-
cussed in text accompanying notes 285-90, infra.
280. 335 F.2d 518 (5th Cir. 1964).
281. 301 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1962).
282. Id. at 658.
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has adopted the Hort-Lake rationale in the agency contract area. In Joseph W.
Brown283 the sale of a contract under which taxpayer worked as director of
agencies for an insurance company was held to give rise to ordinary income under
Lake, Eidson and Bisbee-Baldwin Corp. In Pridemark, Inc., 28 4 involving a service
organization which solicited customers for a construction company in return for
a commission on the price of houses built and work done, ordinary income was
held to have been received on the sale of a number of contracts with customers
on which no deliveries of materials had been made or work done, relying on
Lake and Eidson.
In rejecting Jones v. Corbyn, the above decisions apply literally the Hort-
Lake doctrine and treat the taxpayer's receipts not allocable to goodwill as pay-
ment for actual performance of the contract. Other decisions in the Fifth and
Second Circuits, however, recognize the fallacy inherent in that doctrine and allow
capital gain for receipts which seem to represent the value of the right to per-
form future services. Nelson Weaver Realty Corp. v. Commissioner 85 involved
the assignment of a mortgage servicing contract similar to that in Bisbee-
Baldwin Corp. In the course of servicing mortgages for a life insurance company
under the contract, the taxpayer had accumulated 1830 mortgage accounts, and
sold its right to service these accounts, all the records and files compiled over
the years in connection with these mortgage loans, and also a list of approxi-
mately 1600 mortgagors who were satisfied former customers of taxpayer. The
Court noted that these records provided a ready made market for future loans
and as prospects for sales of homes, insurance and like items. "It cannot be
doubted," said the Court, "that the sum total of the ingredients of this long-
standing relationship with such a satisfied clientele constitutes a property right
which is the equivalent of good will-the probability that the old customers will
resort to the old place.' 2 8 0 Therefore the entire amount received, about 120,000
dollars, was capital gain. However, the entire 120,000 dollars was not received
for the value of good will. In rejecting the application of Lake, where the sales
price of the oil payment was almost the exact equivalent of the income to be
produced in the future, the Court noted that the amount paid for the right to
service the assigned mortgage accounts was the buyer's anticipated net profit after
his costs of collection, only about 16,000 dollars. 287 This amount represented
the excess of the value of the right to perform the personal services required in
servicing the accounts over the cost of performance. It is the amount by which
the commitment to pay for such services had appreciated above the cost of per-
formance as evidenced by the fact that the buyer was willing to pay this amount
in order to substitute his own performance at a smaller net return. The seller,
therefore, received gain for the sale of the appreciated commitment in the con-
283. 40 T.C. 861 (1963).
284. 42 T.C. 510 (1964).
285. 307 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1962).
286. Id. at 901.
287. Id. at 902.
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tract with the life insurance company and the holding in Nelson Weaver is that
this gain is capital gain and not compensation for performance of services.
Rejected was the Hort-Lake principle, the position of the dissent that the
amount paid for the right to receive service fees for the remaining years of the
outstanding loans was "simply converting future income into present income"
28 8
and that the portion of the sales price allocable to the "future income" was
ordinary income. Also, the argument of the Commissioner that the controlling
principle was that of Corn Products Refining Co.2 89 was rejected. The Court
held that the isolated sale of an agency contract cannot be equated to the
routine day-to-day sale of corn futures as part of everyday business operations.
Corn Products was thus narrowly construed as applying only to business property
which is in the nature of stock in trade or property held for sale to customers2 90
A more explicit criticism of the Hort-Lake future income doctrine was made
in United States v. Dresser Industries, Inc.291 where the Fifth Circuit was pre-
sented with a situation similar to that in Halliburton Oil. Taxpayer owned an
exclusive license to practice a patented process in return for a percentage of the
fees earned thereby. Fifteen years after acquiring the license, the taxpayer
agreed with the patentee to release his exclusive rights, retaining a non-exclusive
right to practice the patent, in return for 500,000 dollars payable by the patentee
out of his future earnings from the license. Rejecting the application of Corn
Products by giving it a restrictive "stock in trade" interpretation, and holding
that Lake did not apply since taxpayer sold the entire "exclusivity" feature,
a "vertical slice" rather than a "carve out," the Court held that taxpayer had
sold income producing "property." Halliburton Oil was distinguished on the
ground that there the taxpayer had a right to sub-license the patent and the
receipt was attributable to this right so that taxpayer "merely substituted the
right to receive ordinary income from one source for the right to receive ordinary
income from another."2 2 However, this attempt at distinction loses its force
in view of the Court's lengthy analysis and criticism of the HTort-Lake future
income rationale. The Court felt compelled to answer the government's "broad
assertion ...that, in any case where the purchase price includes anticipated
income there can be no capital gains treatment .... ,,293 Criticizing the Eidson
Court's literal acceptance of the Supreme Court's generalization in Lake to mean
that any amount paid which represents the present value of future income to
be earned is taxed as ordinary income, the Court noted that:
As a legal or economic position, this cannot be so. The only commercial
value of any property is the present worth of future earnings or use-
fulness. If the expectation of earnings of stock rises, the market value
288. Ibid.
289. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
290. For an excellent discussion of the role of Corn Products in this area see Chireistein,
supra note 47, at 36-43.
291. 324 F.2d 56 (5th Cir. 1963).
292. id. at 59. On this point see Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 28, 29.
293. 324 F.2d at 58.
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of the stock may rise; at least a part of this increase in price is attribut-
able to the expectation of increased income.., the fact that the income
which could be earned would be ordinary income is immaterial; such
would be true of the sale of all income-producing property 0 4
In the course of its discussion, the Court emphasized that there is "a vast
difference between the present sale of the future right to earn income and the
present sale of the future right to earned income. '295 This statement, of course,
clearly differentiates the sale of the right to future earnings from the sale of the
right to past earnings, the latter clearly giving rise to ordinary income under the
"accrued income" cases. The sale of the right to earn future income, however,
is not the same as earning it under the rationale of this case. The value of the
right to practice the patent had obviously increased over the period of years
it was practiced by the taxpayer, and capital gain treatment was accorded for
this increase in value.
The Hort-Lake approach was also rejected by the Second Circuit in Com-
missioner v. Ferrer.2 90 Holding that amounts received for surrender of a lease
of a play were capital gains, the Court noted that the future income rationale
was inconsistent with the capital gain treatment accorded to a lessee of real
property upon the sale of a lease from which he is receiving business income or
subrentals under Golonsky, McCue Bros. and Drummond, and section 1241.
Likewise, held the Court, capital gain was not prevented because the sales price
294. Id. at 59. Judge Brown, concurring, further criticized the Commissioner's position:
I think this is both bad economics and faulty law. A person acquires property
for one of two, or both reasons. The first is to receive earnings, i.e., income. The
other is to hold the property for appreciation resulting from long or short range
economic conditions, inflation or the like. Normally, of course, the predominant rea-
son is to acquire the earning capacity represented by the earnings which the prop-
erty will generate.
Hence it is that among those who trade in corporate securities on established
national exchanges or over-the-counter markets, there are recognized rules of thumb
by which the present value, hence market price, is determined for a given stock.
The same is true in the contemporary, frequent practice of large-scale corporate
acquisitions by one corporation of the stock or assets of another corporation. Value
-market or sales price-is determined by capitalizing earnings. Whether the formula
is the conservative one of 6 or 7 times earnings, or something less, or one consider-
ably more speculative, what the buyer offers is his estimate of the present, dis-
counted value of the future earnings of the assets or enterprise.
But although this sales price is determined by future earnings, and to the seller
it takes the place of what he would have received had he continued his ownership,
under no stretch of the imagination is it "ordinary income" either in the business
world or in the sometimes more weird, tax world. Were this so, then every such
sale for a price in excess of cost would entail this analysis and this tax consequence.
There would first have to be ascertained what portion of the excess represented the
present value of future earnings and what portion represented merely capital appre-
ciation, from enhancement in value caused by inflation, scarcity or the like. Then as
a second step, that portion or the excess of sales price representing future earnings
would be taxed as ordinary income, the remainder as capital gains.
Conceding that Congress might compel this, that the ubiguitous and voracious
tax gatherer might demand it, or that courts might ultimately sustain it, the fact is
that as yet none has gone so fast so far.
Id. at 61.
295. Id. at 59.
296. 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
CAPITAL GAINS
was to be paid in deferred payments over a number of years rather than in a lump
sum, downgrading the importance of this factor in the capital gains policies.
Also in Dorman v. United States,297 where an option to acquire a partnership
interest was held a capital asset, the Ninth Circuit rejected the Commissioner's
argument that the proceeds of the sale of the option was ordinary income. Agree-
ing with him that the payment received on sale of the option was compensation
for the loss of future profits, the Court came to the opposite conclusion and
held the contractual rights representing such value was a capital asset.
In summary, it is difficult to see the development of any consistent rule
regarding the application of the Hort-Lake future income rationale. The Ninth
Circuit in Holt, the Fifth Circuit in Eidson, Woolsey, Bisbee-Baldwin Corp.,
General Guaranty Mortgage Co., and the Tax Court in Brown and Pridemark
Inc., have applied Hort-Lake to deny capital gain to the amounts received upon
sale of a contract requiring future personal services of the seller. The same rule
has been applied by the Tenth Circuit in Halliburton Oil, a case involving the
appreciation in value of an exclusive license to practice a patent. Rejecting the
Hort-Lake principle in the area of contracts requiring the performance of per-
sonal services is the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Nelson Weaver Realty Corp.,
which appears to be in clear conflict with Holt and with decisions of another
panel of the same Court in Eidson, Bisbee-Baldwin Corp., Woolsey and General
Guaranty Mortgage Co., all involving management or mortgage-servicing con-
tracts. And the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Dresser Industries Inc. seems to
reach a result contrary to Halliburton Oil in the area of exclusive license or
patent contracts. Perhaps the Fifth Circuit's lucid exposition in Dresser In-
dustries of the future-income rationale will lead to greater consistency of decision
in similar cases. However, it is difficult to predict the impact of Dresser Industries
where the contract sold is one calling for future personal services and involves
no physical property such as a patent, as, for example, the situations presented
in Holt and Eidson. There seems to be no reason in theory why the future income
rights in such cases should be less qualifying property than in Dresser Industries.
There, the lack of commitment of funds or credit was ignored so apparently the
Fifth Circuit, unlike the Tenth Circuit in Halliburton Oil, will not require a
capital investment. Moreover the Court's decision in Nelson Weaver Realty Inc.,
and its explicit criticism of Eidson in Dresser Industries provide evidence that
the Dresser Industries rule will receive broad application by at least one panel
of the Fifth Circuit.2 98
3. "Naked Contract Rights"
The third approach of the courts in denying capital gain on the sale or
cancellation of contracts is to deny the contract status as "property." Thus, if
297. 296 F.2d 27 (9th Cir. 1961).
298. See, Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 25, n.77.
53
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the taxpayer is held to have a "naked contract right"20 9 as distinguished from
right of more "substance" 300 than mere contract rights, he will not have a capital
asset. The rule is also expressed in terms of taxpayer's remedy for breach of the
contract. If his remedy is an equitable one for an injunction or specific perform-
ance, then his contract is "property." If he can obtain relief only in damages,
he has no "property."'30
1
The Second Circuit first applied these concepts in Commissioner v. The Pitt-
ston Co.30 2 where taxpayer received 500,000 dollars on the cancellation of a
contract under which he had the exclusive right to purchase the output of a mine.
Denying capital gain treatment, the Court noted that the contract "carried with
it no direct interest in the mine itself, or in the coal produced." 30 3 "It was a
naked contract right," continued the Court, "not in the nature of a lease or a
profit a prendre. °30 4 Distinguished were the lessee-cancellation cases 305 and the
sale of life estate cases30 as involving rights having more "substance than mere
contract rights. °30 7 In support of this analysis, the Court noted that if the
mine owner had been able to find someone other than the taxpayer who would
sell his coal at less cost to him taxpayer's only remedy would have been in
damages. The Court added that the receipt was essentially a substitute for
future ordinary income, and that the cancellation suggested a "tax avoidance
purpose."308
A vigorous dissent argued that taxpayer had sold more than "naked con-
tract rights," and, also pointed out that the future income rationale was mis-
applied since any future income payable under the contract would first have to
be earned by efficient operation on the taxpayer's business. The 500,000 dollars
received was not "future income" but the value to the mine owner of having him-
self and his property free of the commitment to sell exclusively to the taxpayer;
that is, it reflects not future income, but the value of the asset sold.30 0
Because the Pittston result is based on several grounds, including a lack of
"sale or exchange," the case is not square authority that capital asset status
turns upon the availability of equitable relief. Such authority is provided, how-
ever, by the decision of the Second Circuit in Commissioner v. Ferrer.1 "' The
facts in Ferrer bear repetition. In 1951, actor Jose Ferrer entered into a standard
299. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958); accord, Rev. Rul.
56-531, 1956-2 Cum. Bull. 983.
300. Commissioner v. Pittston Co., supra note 299.
301. Ibid. Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1962).
302. 252 F.2d 344 (2d Cir. 1958).
303. Id. at 348.
304. Ibid.
305. Commissioner v. McCue Bros. & Drummond, Inc., 210 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1954);
Commissioner v. Golonsky, 200 F.2d 72 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 939 (1953).
306. McAllister v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1946).
307. This proposition is highly reminiscent of the view taken in Thurlow E. McFall,
34 B.T.A. 108 (1936), that a long term employment contract is not the same as "a share of
stock, a bond, or a thing." Id. at 110.
308. 252 F.2d at 348.
309. Id. at 350.
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contract with Pierre LaMure whereby he agreed to produce a stage play based
upon LaMure's novel "Moulin Rouge," a biography of Henri de Toulouse-
Lautrec. By the contract, Ferrer was "leased" the exclusive right to produce
and present the play in the United States and Canada. He also acquired
the right to prevent any disposition of the motion picture rights prior to the time
the play had run for a specified period of time, and the right to receive 40 per-
cent of the motion picture proceeds if the play was in fact produced and pre-
sented according to the contract requirements. The contract specifically reserved
to LaMure all title, both legal and equitable, to all rights, including the movie,
radio and television rights, other than the right to produce the play. In 1952,
after being approached to play the part of Toulouse-Lautrec in a movie to be
made by Moulin Productions, Inc., John Huston's production company, Ferrer
agreed to cancel the contract with LaMure, thus allowing Huston to obtain the
motion picture rights, in consideration of a contract with Moulin whereby Ferrer
would play the part of Toulouse-Lautrec in a motion picture in return for a
stated salary together with a percentage of the net motion picture receipts. In
1953, after the motion picture, "Moulin Rouge," was completed, in addition to
his salary which he reported as ordinary income, Ferrer received 180,000 dollars
as his share of the percentage receipts. This amount he claimed to be capital
gain arising out of his sale of the contract.
Clearing the way for an analysis of what rights Ferrer conveyed, the Court
held against the Commissioner's contention that a "cancellation" is not a "sale
or exchange,"13 11 found that any interest held by Ferrer was not excluded from
capital asset classification by section 1221(3) since Ferrer was in the role of an
investor of capital taking a risk and was not the "creator" of the artistic work,312
and rejected the application of the Lake future income rationale.313 Also, the
finding of the Tax Court that the percentage compensation was to no extent
received for personal services but solely for the release of the contract was upheld.
Noting that although performance of personal services as an actor was a nec-
essary condition to the payment of the percentage compensation, nevertheless,
held the Court, the right was given in consideration of the cancellation of the
contract with LaMure.
The Court approached the problem of the nature of Ferrer's rights by
noting that there was no single definitive test of a capital asset either in the
statute or in the cases. Observing that it was "difficult, perhaps impossible, ...
to frame a positive definition of universal validity," it seemed to be criticizing
Pittston when it stated:
Attempts to do this in terms of the degree of clothing adorning the
contract cannot explain all the cases, however helpful they may be in
deciding some, perhaps even this one; it would be hard to think of a
311. See text accompanying notes 252-58, supra.
312. 304 F.2d at 132.
313. Ibid.
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contract more "naked" than a debenture, yet no one doubts that is a
"capital asset" if held by an investor.3 14
Having said that, the Court sought to find a solution by analysis of cases in
"adjacent areas.1316 After rejecting Jones v. Corbyn, it launched into a synthesis
of these cases and concluded:
One common characteristic of the group held to come within the capital
gain provision is that the taxpayer had either what might be called an
"estate" in (Golonsky, McCue, Metropolitan), or an "encumbrance"
on (Ray), or an option to acquire an interest in (Dorman), property
which, if itself held, would be a capital asset. In all these cases the
taxpayer had something more than an opportunity, afforded by con-
tract, to obtain periodic receipts of income, by dealing with another
(Starr, Leh, General Artists, Pittston), or by rendering services (Holt),
or by virtue of ownership of a larger "estate" (Hort, P. G. Lake). We
are painfully aware of the deficiencies of any such attempt to define
the wavering line even in this limited area, but it is the best we can
do.316
The Court then went on to deal separately with each of the three rights sold by
Ferrer; his "lease" of the exclusive right to produce the play, his power to pre-
vent disposition of the motion picture rights, and his right to receive forty per-
cent of the motion picture proceeds. Amounts received for surrender of the "lease"
of the play were capital gains since an interest similar to that of a lessee's had
been given up. Such an interest, held the Court, was an "equitable interest" in
the copyright itself, interference with which would have been enjoined by a
court of equity. Therefore, it constituted "property" under section 1221. The
second right, Ferrer's power to prevent disposition of the motion picture pro-
ceeds until after production of the play, was also held to constitute an equitable
interest in the copyright which would be protected by a court of equity. The
Court stressed that the factor of injunctive relief distinguished this case from
Pittston. Furthermore, held the Court, this right was a "cloud" on LaMure's
title in the nature of a negative covenant on the motion picture rights and "the
dissipation of the cloud arising from the negative covenant seems analogous to
the tenant's relinquishment of a right to prevent his landlord from leasing to
another tenant in the same business, held to be the sale or exchange of a capital
asset in Ray. '3 17 The third right, to receive forty percent of the proceeds of the
motion picture, was held not to be a capital asset because of the specific provision
in the contract that all legal and equitable rights in the motion picture rights,
other than the right to receive the percentage receipts, were retained by LaMure.
Ferrer therefore had obtained no property interest in the film rights enforceable
in a court of equity and so any amount allocable to the release of this right was
ordinary income.
314. 304 F.2d at 129-30.
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The Ferrer rule was applied in Maryland Coal & Coke Co. v. McGinnes318
where the District Court found ordinary income on the termination of an exclu-
sive agency agreement entitling the taxpayer to sell all the coal from a mine
for the entire life of the mine at a stated commission. Rejecting Jones v. Corbyn
and citing Ferrer, the Court held that the agency contract was not a capital
asset for the reason that it failed to confer upon the taxpayer "an enforceable
estate, encumbrance or interest in an object or thing ... the right created was
simply one to perform a service, that of an agent to sell his principal's interest
in ... the coal which . . .carries with it no interest in either the coal or the
mine."310 Since taxpayer had only the right to perform services for compensation,
continued the Court, its only means of redress for breach of contract was a suit
for damages and it was only this right to damages that was sold. This is not a
capital asset, held the Court, under the "overwhelming authority"3 20 of such
cases as Eidson, Holt, and Pittston. Distinguished were the lease cancellation
cases as involving more than a mere contractual opportunity to earn periodic
receipts by rendering services. In this group was included Dresser Industries
because the taxpayer had an interest in a patent. Also distinguished were the
cases such as Bisbee-Baldwin Corp., Nelson Weaver Realty Co., and Elliot B.
Smoak which were held to involve the sale of goodwill items.
The "equitable interest" standard seems to be an elaboration upon and to
derive directly from the "naked contract" principle of Pittston. It also has
obvious overtones of "substantial property" deriving from Blair and conveyed
through Blair's direct descendants, the life estate and lease cancellation cases.
Indeed, the emphasis in Blair on the difference between "an equitable interest in
property" and a mere "chose in action" 321 could be used as a restatement of the
Ferrer principle. This principle requires that in order to have a capital asset, one
must have more than simply a claim for money to be earned by the performance
of services or by dealing with another; there must be some ownership interest in
the property with which the contract deals. This rule comes about not through
any considered relationship with capital gains policies, but rather through a
synthesis of the decisions dealing with contractual rights, which decisions them-
selves were not reasoned from the proper policy premises. The result is a syn-
thetic rule which, although it gives a great degree of certainty to the capital
asset definition, fails seriously to carry out the intent of Congress.
The first objection to the rule is that it lets form control substance. Ferrer's
third right-to share in forty percent of the proceeds of any motion picture if
he produced the play-was held to be an ordinary income asset because it did
not represent an interest in the underlying copyright but only in the proceeds
therefrom. However, it made no practical or economic difference in the rights of
the parties whether Ferrer received forty percent of the proceeds of the movie
318. 225 F. Supp. 854 (ED. Pa. 1964).
319. Id. at 857-58.
320. Id. at 856.
321. See text accompanying notes 51-52, supra.
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under the arrangement made or because he owned a forty percent interest in the
portion of the copyright relating to the motion picture rights. Secondly, to allow
the definition of a capital asset to turn basically upon notions of "equitable
estates" and concepts of "remedy" is to introduce into the capital asset definition
matters essentially unrelated to capital gains policies. The Ferrer opinion recog-
nized that "it would be hard to think of a contract more 'naked' than a deben-
ture, yet no one doubts that is a 'capital asset' if held by an investor."322 In the
light of this statement, the Court's lengthy development of an "equitable inter-
est" standard is at least puzzling. If the sale of a bond gets capital gain upon the
general decline of interest rates, then the sale of a right to render services or to
deal with another should not be denied capital gain after a drop in the cost of the
seller's performance on the ground essentially that the contract right is "naked."
Moreover, aside from the obvious example of the debenture or bond, both the
Commissioner and the courts have given capital gains status to "naked" rights to
share in future profits3 23 These cases reflect the intent of Congress and the
position of the Supreme Court that capital gain be allowed for gain due to the
appreciation in value of an investment asset. Value appreciation can be present
without regard to the ownership of an equitable interest in property or avail-
ability of a specific remedy.
Perhaps the "substantial property" standard is an attempt to articulate a
requirement of capital investment in order to have an "investment." But even
here it would prove too much since it would rule out of the capital asset category
the lease, which it was not intended to do since the lessee-cancellation cases are
the foundation of the Court's reasoning in Ferrer. Or, the test may be tied up
with the necessity under the contract to perform personal services. The Court
did approve the finding of the Tax Court in favor of Ferrer on this issue. Never-
theless, the Court's reliance on Herman Shumlin324 a case involving a sale of
accrued personal service income, and on Holt, seems to indicate that although
the Court did not find Ferrer was being paid for past services, perhaps it felt
that his right to share in the motion picture proceeds was compensation for
services rendered or to be rendered.32 r5 Also, and even though the Court rejected
the future income rationale, there may still be a tendency to treat amounts paid
for the increase in value of a commitment to perform services as paid for the
actual performance thereof. Thus, the Court in Maryland Coal & Coke Co.
relied on Eidson and Holt and stressed the fact that the taxpayer's "only right
was to perform services for compensation. '320 The problem with this statement
may arise from the fact that the emphasis is in the wrong place; it could be
rephrased as follows: "taxpayer's only right was to receive compensation for
personal services." Thus expressed the emphasis is on the commitment of the
322. 304 F.2d at 129.
323. See note 132, supra; see also, Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 32-36.
324. 16 T.C. 407 (1951).
325. Chirelstein, supra note 47, at 23, 24.
326. 225 F. Supp. at 858.
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mine owner to pay, and it can be more easily seen that the value of that commit-
ment has increased.
The Ferrer case, while rejecting the largely irrelevant Hort-Lake rationale
and placing the "sale or exchange" issue in its proper perspective, nevertheless
launched a new test which stems from Blair, a test of "substantial property."
This appears to be a substitution of one irrelevancy for another; a reliance upon
a different branch of the "fruit-tree" metaphor in defining a capital asset.
V. CONCLUSION
Just prior to the writing of this section there was published in the Annual
Report of the Section of Taxation of the American Bar Association 27 a subcom-
mittee report on a study concerning the nature of gain from the disposition of
personal service contracts. The subcommittee could make no present recommen-
dation for legislation, and made an observation that nicely sums up the effect of
"fruit and tree" on the capital asset definition:
on the basis of an exhaustive analysis of the authorities, . . . it is ex-
tremely difficult to reconcile the treatment of certain contractual rela-
tionships as giving rise to ordinary income (i.e., the "assignment of
income" cases) with the common-law concept of property rights, which
supposedly underlie the capital gain definitional sections. The subcom-
mittee was able to conclude that many of the problems in this vexing
area of analysis are settled judicially by virtue of the placement of
given contract receipts in pigeon holes which have traditionally come to
connote either capital gain or ordinary income. The subcommittee re-
cognized that ultimate resolution of the problems in this area of taxa-
tion can only be achieved when the purposes of the capital gains privi-
lege itself are more fully articulated by the Congress.328
It would indeed be profitable to have the purposes of the capital gains
privilege better articulated by Congress. However, it is submitted that there has
been sufficient articulation to avoid some of the complexity referred to in the
subcommittee report. This complexity stems, in the main, from an attempt to
simplify the problem of capital asset definition through use of "fruit and tree."
The resulting "pigeon holes," however, have only the advantage of apparent
simplicity. The "future income" rationale of Hort-Lake becomes increasingly
difficult to handle as the courts extend its reach to traditional capital gains
transactions. The "property" approach of Blair, attractive in lending a degree
of certainty and scope to the capital asset definition, is essentially irrelevant to
the Congressional purposes regarding preference for conversion of investment
gains due to appreciation in value. The connection between "equitable remedy"
and "substantial property" on one hand and investment property, such as a
bond, on the other has yet to be demonstrated.
Nor is the difficulty of the problem of defining property lost upon the
327. 1 A.B.MA. Bulletin Section of Taxation July 1965.
328. Id. at 107-08.
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courts. Apparently this difficulty has led them to define the nature of a capital
asset via the "sale or exchange" route. By using a test of whether the asset
transferred survived the transaction, there was avoided the need to struggle with
the more difficult problem of whether the asset was "property." Nevertheless,
this process is merely another way of defining "property." Its use again lends
certainty and scope to the capital asset definition. But the test is in no way
related to Congressional purpose in this respect. Indeed, the subcommittee report
above mentioned took the view that:
the sale or exchange requirement is essentially a technical stumbling
block, which ought not be dispositive of the issue of capital gain on
this type of property rights. Thus, the subcommittee has under active
consideration an amendment to § 1241 ("sale or exchange" treatment
granted to cancellation of certain types of franchises and agreements)
which would extend the provisions of that section to the cancellation
or extinguishment of any contract right, and would treat the proceeds
thereof as derived from a sale or exchange.329
Whether or not Congress again addresses itself to this complex problem, it
is time for a re-evaluation upon the part of the courts as to the effect of the
"assignment of income cases" upon the capital asset definition. The severance
of "fruit and tree" from "property" as used in section 1221 can only help to
untangle complexity.
329. Id. at 108.
